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INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared the 2009
H1N1 swine flu a pandemic on June 11, 2009.1 This is the first
influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century.2 In response to the
rapid spread of the global 2009 H1N1 swine flu, which proved
fatal in some cases, pharmaceutical companies developed an
effective vaccine against the 2009 H1N1 swine flu (“2009 H1N1
vaccine”).3 These pharmaceutical companies submitted patent
1
See Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Statement Recognizing Swine
Flu Pandemic 1 (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
influenzaAH1N1_presstranscript_20090611.pdf.
2
See generally Luan-Yin Chang et al., Novel Swine-Origin Influenza Virus A (H1N1):
The First Pandemic of the 21st Century, 108 J. FORMOS MED. ASSOC. 526 (2009),
available at http://ajws.elsevier.com/ajws_archive/200971087A6406.pdf; Sami Al Hajjar
& Kenneth McIntosh, The First Influenza Pandemic of the 21st Century, 30 ANN. SAUDI
MED. 1 (2010), available at http://www.saudiannals.net/temp/AnnSaudiMed30116952164_191841.pdf.
3
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu
Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/vaccine_keyfacts.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine]; U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and
Lot
Release,
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance
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applications for their novel 2009 H1N1 vaccine formulation.4
Patent law incentivizes inventors to develop new ideas by giving
the patentees economic inducements in exchange for the research,
development, time, and resources that they invest in producing the
invention.5
Pharmaceutical companies hope to obtain the
protections of a patent, which would give them the exclusive right
to manufacture and distribute this vaccine.6
However, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine poses several unique issues
that interfere with the typical structure of patent applications and
the associated incentives for patent applicants. For example, while
pharmaceutical companies want to patent their inventions, obtain
exclusive rights, and generate profits from their vaccines,7 public
health goals are furthered by disseminating the vaccine to as many
individuals as possible in order to achieve widespread disease
protection by immunizing the public.8 In addition, whereas patent
protection furthers society’s goals, patenting pharmaceutical
products and biotechnological inventions in general, and the 2009
H1N1 vaccine in particular, raises unique moral questions.9
Due to the expected severity of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic, several public health agencies became actively involved
in tracking the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus, educating the public
about this illness, suggesting preventative vaccination against this
virus, and offering medical treatment options in the event that a
patient contracts this disease.10 The vaccines produced by
RegulatoryInformation/Post-MarketActivities/LotReleases/ucm181956.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines
Composition and Lot Release].
4
See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 20090047353 (filed Nov. 6, 2006).
5
See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
6
See Kyle Wamstad, Priority Review Vouchers—A Piece of the Incentive Puzzle, 14
VA. J.L. & TECH. 126, 129 (2009).
7
See id. at 131 (“Without the market exclusivity and protections of patented property,
researchers would not likely invest significant time and resources to develop modern drug
therapies.”).
8
See Joseph Nicosia III, Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of Preparing for Global
Pandemic, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 479, 491–92 (2006).
9
See infra Part I.A.3.
10
See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, 2009 H1N1
Flu]; World Health Organization, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, http://www.who.int/csr/
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pharmaceutical companies will aid public health agencies, such as
the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”), in implementing their disease management goals.
Therefore, these public health agencies, as well as the federal
government, collaborated with the pharmaceutical industry to
achieve the desired public health goals of reducing 2009 H1N1
swine flu transmission, improving immunity against this disease,
and reducing symptoms or severe complications, including death,
in instances where the illness cannot be prevented.11 Yet while
public health agencies and government authorities may believe that
it is imperative to pool their resources with pharmaceutical
companies’ resources for the benefit of the public’s health, the
differences between these entities’ immediate goals pose
challenges. Specifically, the patentees’ goals of economic rewards
and the pharmaceutical companies’ goals of profits could conflict
with public health organizations’ goals of safe and effective
vaccines and widespread vaccination that will reduce the incidence
of disease.
The conflicts existing between patent law and public health
objectives are particularly apparent and extremely relevant in the
context of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic. This Note will
examine the conflict between the exclusive rights that each
pharmaceutical company seeks to achieve via its patents for the
2009 H1N1 vaccine12 and the requirements of public health
agencies and the federal government whose utmost priority is the
protection of the public’s health.13 Specifically, this Note will
address two inter-related conflicts that have arisen.14 The first

disease/swineflu/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter WHO, Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009].
11
See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
supra note 10. In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was actively
involved in approving the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in a timely manner. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2
(2010).
12
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13
See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS 869 (7th ed. 2007).
14
A third conflict, which also entails a timing issue, involves the need to create the
vaccine and produce it in a timely fashion versus the requirements set forth by the FDA,
an agency that must carefully and diligently examine the risks and benefits of the
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tension involves the financial gain and the exclusivity right desired
by the pharmaceutical companies that have applied for patents as
opposed to the goals of public health authorities who seek to
immunize as many individuals as possible at no cost to the public.
The second related tension involves the notion that an influenza
vaccine, in general, is usually effective for only one flu season.15
This fact partially offsets the inherent financial benefits accrued
once a patent is granted to a pharmaceutical company for a patent
term of twenty years,16 a benefit that appears to be unnecessary
because the usefulness of the vaccine will have ended after one flu
season, a time period of less than one year.17
In its evaluation of the first conflict, this Note examines how
the United States government intervened in response to the 2009
H1N1 swine flu pandemic in order to resolve this situation in a
manner that achieves the desired public health outcome. After
purchasing 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines from pharmaceutical
companies, the federal government made these vaccines available
to the public at no charge.18 This mass purchase of the 2009 H1N1
vaccine by the government satisfied the financial compensation
that the pharmaceutical companies sought in return for their
research, development, and production efforts while concurrently
achieving the public health goal of widespread 2009 H1N1 vaccine
distribution. This Note proposes additional solutions that help
resolve the aforementioned conflict in the case of the 2009 H1N1
swine flu pandemic; it also presents solutions that can be applied to
future pandemics or to public health crises of similar magnitude.
For example, in order to combat a shortage not only of the 2009
proposed vaccine before it is marketed to the public. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2. This conflict
will not be addressed in this Note.
15
See ANTHONY E. FIORE, M.D. ET AL., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION
PRACTICES, PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF SEASONAL INFLUENZA WITH VACCINES (2009),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5808a1.htm (indicating
that “[i]nfluenza viruses undergo frequent antigenic change (i.e., antigenic drift); to gain
immunity against viruses in circulation, patients must receive an annual vaccination
against the influenza viruses that are predicted on the basis of viral surveillance data”).
16
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
17
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, H1N1 Flu: What You Should
Know and Do This Flu Season If You Are 65 Years and Older (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/65andolder.htm [hereinafter CDC, 65 and Older].
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H1N1 vaccine, but also shortages of the seasonal flu vaccine, the
government could establish additional laboratories specifically for
the purpose of vaccine production. These government laboratories
could prove beneficial in cases of pandemics, such as the 2009
H1N1 swine flu, when the facilities of the private pharmaceutical
companies are overtaxed due to urgent demands for maximal
vaccine production. The government laboratories could function
in a manner similar to a licensing agreement.
Various
compensation arrangements could then be created to financially
reward the patentee.
The second conflict addressed in this Note analyzes the
disparity between the twenty-year length of the patent term19 and
the clinical efficacy of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine or any other
influenza vaccines, which are typically limited to only one flu
season.20 It discusses the possibility of employing short-term
patents in a manner similar to the rapidly evolving computer
software technology industry. This Note also suggests another
expedited patent approval process that could be effective in
curtailing the deleterious effects associated with public health
emergency situations. Under this approach, patents relating to
emergency public health crises would be evaluated immediately by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
examiners.21 On the other hand, this Note posits that vaccines and
other biotechnological innovations provide benefits for the public
good beyond the initial pandemic or primary disease duration due
to the usefulness of the scientific process and methodology
introduced by the inventor. Therefore, granting a twenty-year
patent would appear logical especially in view of the extensive
research that is required prior to releasing the vaccine or other
biotechnological innovation.
The twenty-year patent would
concomitantly promote inventors and pharmaceutical companies to
achieve the concurrent goals of combating disease and promoting
public health while reaping financial rewards for themselves.
19

See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21
The amount of time that a patent examiner typically spends evaluating a patent
application during prosecution is eighteen hours. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001).
20
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Part I of this Note (1) provides an overview of the rights
granted by a patent, a discussion of the incentives for patenting
vaccines, and an analysis of the morality of patent law as it relates
to vaccines; (2) discusses the goals of public health and health law,
and addresses the unique issues that arise with vaccines; and (3)
describes the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic and the 2009 H1N1
vaccine, as well as the history of previous flu outbreaks, including
the 1976 H1N1 swine flu outbreak and vaccine. Part II of this
Note discusses the conflict that arises between patents and public
health law within the context of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic. Recommendations to resolve these conflicts are
presented, including an evaluation of the policies that the United
States government has already implemented in order to resolve the
conflict. Part III of this Note discusses the conflict between the
twenty-year patent term and the short duration of public health
benefits derived from the clinical use of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.
This section also proposes suggestions to reconcile this conflict,
including issuing short-term patents and providing incentives for
the long-term value derived from developing biotechnological
innovations.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law
Congress regulates patent law. The United States Constitution
grants Congress the “[p]ower . . . to promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”22 Thus, the Constitution authorizes
Congress to provide inventors with exclusive rights over their
discoveries in order to encourage scientific innovation and
progress.23

22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Wamstad, supra note 6, at 129 (“From its inception Congress has been entrusted to
nurture innovation through grants of exclusive market power to patent recipients . . . .
[T]he Founders recognized that invention led to utility and authorized Congress to confer
an exclusive market right to encourage such invention.”).
23
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This section of the Note evaluates the conferral of patent rights
upon scientists and companies who develop biological products,24
specifically vaccines, in exchange for these companies’ assistance
in “promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience.”25
Part I.A.1
delineates the requirements for obtaining a patent and describes the
rights that a patentee receives once a patent is issued. Part I.A.2
explains the inherent value and benefit derived by the patentee that
would motivate the inventor to seek a patent for the newly
invented vaccine. Part I.A.3 discusses the morality debate
associated with patenting vaccines and addresses several
arguments and counter-arguments.
1. Patent Eligibility and Rights Granted by a Patent
The United States codified the Patent Act26 in order to
implement a national standard of patentability.27 In order to obtain
a patent in the United States, an inventor must file an application
with the PTO.28 The PTO engages in a formal evaluation of each
application, which must be reviewed by professional examiners.29
These examiners review each invention that is potentially eligible
for a patent to ensure that the device complies with the Patent Act,
which sets forth five requirements for patentability: subject matter,
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure.30
The Patent Act specifies that patents will only cover a limited
subject matter, which extends to a “process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement

24

HUGH B. WELLONS ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 605 (2007) (“Biological
products include a diverse range of substances, such as vaccines, blood and blood
components, allergenics, gene therapy, cellular and tissue-based products, recombinant
therapeutic proteins, and xenotransplantation products.”).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006).
27
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 121. Prior to the codification of the first patent
statute in 1790, “[s]tate patents were granted in most of the original thirteen colonies,
beginning with a Massachusetts patent in 1641.” Id.
28
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, How to Get a Patent, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/patents/howtopat.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
29
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 121.
30
See id. at 124.
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thereof.”31 The second requirement analyzed by the PTO prior to
granting a patent is utility.32 The third requirement, novelty,
enumerates a list of conditions wherein a device is not considered
to be novel and thus not patentable.33 The PTO also scrutinizes the
invention to ensure that the discovery was not obvious.34 The
Patent Act determines non-obviousness by comparing the current
invention with previous developments that have been made in the
field.35 The final factor evaluated by the PTO is disclosure, which
31
35 U.S.C. § 101 (delineating the subject matter eligible for patent). In its 2009 term,
the U.S. Supreme Court will decide Bilski v. Kappos. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9,
2009). The Court may reinterpret § 101 and the statutory scope of patentability at that
time. The Patent Act also requires the inventor to include “one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention” in the specification. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
32
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). However, the importance of the utility
prerequisite to patentability has decreased over time. Currently, the definition of utility is
so broad that it even encompasses inventions that have only worked in experimental
situations, but have not acquired any actual use. MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 124
(“Only if an invention has absolutely no ‘practical utility’ will a patent be denied.”). Yet,
this broad definition may be slightly circumscribed because it is unclear “whether
laboratory promise is enough to establish utility in treating human patients.” Id. This
quote about the patentability of pharmaceuticals, such as vaccines, during their
experimental stages is relevant to the subject matter of this Note, which is concerned with
the swine flu. It is also interesting to note that Baxter International Inc., one of the
pharmaceutical companies that developed a swine flu vaccine, filed a patent for the
vaccine on August 28, 2008, approximately one year before the swine flu outbreak that
began in March 2009. U.S. Patent Application No. 20090060950 (filed Aug. 28, 2008).
It is likely that in 2008, when Baxter applied for a patent, its vaccine had only been used
in experimental settings.
33
See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Therefore, if a device meets any of the criteria set forth in
section 102 of the Patent Act, it will not be eligible for a patent. For example, these
conditions include objects that were previously known or used, inventions that were
previously patented, and creations whose subject matter was not invented by the person
seeking the patent. Id. § 102(a), (b), (f). Thus, the novelty requirement employs technical
rules in order to ensure that the patent applicant was the first to invent the device.
MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 124.
34
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).
35
Id. This sub-section underscores that “the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art” must be scrutinized in order to determine nonobviousness. Id. The Patent Act implies that if the differences are not significant enough,
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is comprised of the written description requirement, enablement,
and setting out the best mode.36 This prerequisite to obtaining a
patent obligates the inventor to disclose the process that was
employed when the potentially patentable device was created.
This requirement is imposed so that once the patent expires and the
patentee no longer maintains the right of exclusivity, others would
be able to make the device as well.37
A patent is “the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.”38 A patent
holder, or patentee, has
the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of
the right to exclude others from using, offering for
sale, or selling through the United States, or
importing into the United States, products made by
that process . . . .39

the new creation will not be eligible for a patent. Hence, this requirement “attempts to
measure . . . the technical accomplishment reflected in an invention.” MERGES ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 124 (emphasis in original).
36
See 35 U.S.C. § 112. This factor requires the patentee to write a
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
Id.
37
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 125 (“The disclosure and ‘enablement’
requirements . . . ensure that those ‘skilled in the art’ of the invention can read and
understand the inventor’s contribution, and that after the patent expires they will be able
to make and use the invention themselves.”).
38
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2009). The PTO “examines applications and grants patents on inventions when
applications are entitled to them; it publishes and disseminates patent information,
records assignment of patents, maintains search files of U.S. and foreign patents, and
maintains a search room for public use in examining issued patents and records.” Id.
39
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). The exclusive right held by the patentee gives “the inventor
the right to sue not only those who ‘steal’ his invention, but those who reverse engineer it
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These rights are held by the patentee for a term of twenty
years, which begins to toll on the date that the patent is filed40 even
though the patentee cannot exercise these exclusivity rights until
the date when the patent is granted.41 Although the patentee
possesses these rights under the Patent Act, which include the right
to sell the invention,42 creators of biological products,43 such as
vaccines, are not permitted to sell their inventions in the United
States until the United States Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) grants its approval.44
This Note will focus upon vaccines, specifically the 2009
H1N1 swine flu vaccine, which fall within the realm of scientific
inventions that are eligible for patents because they comply with
the five prerequisites of patentability. Thus, it is presumed that the
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine could obtain the right to
exclusively create the vaccine for a twenty-year patent term.
2. Benefits of and Incentives for Patenting Vaccines
The purpose of patents is to provide the requisite incentive for
inventors whose creations will “advance a public good.”45
However, patent law recognizes that “inventions are public goods
that are costly to make and that are difficult to control once they
are released into the world.”46 In order to strike a balance between
these ends, patent law relies upon economic principles that provide
tangible financial incentives to promote the creation of novel

and even those who develop the same invention independently.” MERGES ET AL., supra
note 5, at 127.
40
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). It is also possible for the term of the patent to begin at an
earlier date if a previous patent application was filed in accordance with other provisions
of the Patent Act. See id.; see also id. §§ 120, 121, 365(c).
41
See id. § 154(a)(2); see also Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express
Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 119, 127 (2005).
42
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
43
See supra note 24.
44
See 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2010). “The exclusionary right . . . [provided by the Patent
Act] does not automatically grant an affirmative right to do anything; patented
pharmaceuticals, for instance, must still pass regulatory review at the Food and Drug
Administration to be sold legally.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 126.
45
Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130.
46
MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127.

C07_KAPLAN_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1002

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/12/2010 4:58 PM

[Vol. 20:991

products. For example, patent law provides economic incentives
for inventors and scientists to invest time and energy in creating
new inventions.47
Specifically, “patents provide incentives to individuals by
offering them recognition for their creativity and material reward
for their marketable inventions. These incentives encourage
innovation,”48 which in turn serves the public good by making
these discoveries available to society.49 It is believed that society
would not benefit without patents because inventors would
otherwise lack the necessary “incentive to invest in creating,
developing, and marketing new products.”50 This phenomenon is
equally relevant to the pharmaceutical industry,51 which develops
vaccines. In order to encourage pharmaceutical companies to
innovate, patent law provides the necessary economic motivation
for these inventors “by allowing [them] to appropriate the full
economic rewards of [their] invention[s].”52
Thus, the
pharmaceutical companies are likely to invest both time and
money into scientific research in exchange for the economic
rewards that are greatly enhanced by the patent exclusivity rights.53
These economic incentives are especially pronounced with
regard to patenting influenza vaccines because each vaccine is only
effective against a certain strain of a disease.54 Although a
47

See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
World Intellectual Property Organization, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents_faq.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)].
49
Eric D. Zard, Patentability of Human Genetic Information: Exploring Ethical
Dilemmas Within the Patent Office and Biotechnology’s Clash with the Public Good, 6
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 486, 491 (2009).
50
MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127.
51
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
52
MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 (describing the “market-driven incentive to
invest in innovation”).
53
Carol A. Schneider, Felicia Cohn & Cynthia Bonner, Patenting Life: A View from
the Constitution and Beyond, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 385, 388 (2002). “This is especially
important in the pharmaceutical field, where bringing a new drug to market can cost
several hundred million dollars.” Id.
54
See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Seasonal Influenza,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
CDC, Seasonal Influenza] (“[I]nfluenza viruses are constantly changing so antibod[ies]
made against one strain will become less effective against new strains.”). It is also
48
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scientist who is researching a vaccine will devote time to this
research just like any other inventor, the time that a scientific
researcher devotes to the creation of a flu vaccine will likely only
be profitable for one flu season,55 which generally translates into
the winter months of a calendar year.56 Moreover, the costs of
creating the vaccine include not only research and development,
but also the costs of production, regulation, and clinical trials.57
Due to the shortened time frame during which developers of
influenza vaccines may recoup their large investments, the creators
of vaccines have an even greater “interest in being rewarded for
their effort, typically by being able to recoup financial investments
in research and development and profit from their inventions.”58
3. Morality Debate Surrounding Vaccine Patents
Vaccines may be viewed as having components of both
pharmaceutical and biotechnological innovations.59 On the one
hand, vaccines act in a manner similar to pharmaceuticals in that
they directly combat and lessen the impact of diseases.60 On the
other hand, vaccines are also similar to biotechnological
innovations because their development involves the manipulation
of viral genetic material.61
Both scholars and practitioners have debated the morality of
granting patents to the creators of pharmaceuticals. The majority
necessary to note that more than one flu virus can be present in a given year. Id.
Furthermore, different variants of the flu exist within each type of influenza virus. Id.
Thus, it becomes apparent that the word “flu” actually accounts for a lot of variability.
55
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Although the timing and length of each
flu season varies, on average “influenza activity peaks in January or later” in the northern
hemisphere. CDC, The Flu Season, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/season/flu-season.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
56
CDC, The Flu Season, supra note 55.
57
See JULIE MILSTEIN & BRENDA CANDRIES, WORLD HEALTH ORG. DEP’T OF VACCINE
& BIOLOGICS, ECONOMICS OF VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION: CHANGES
OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS 3 (1998), http://www.who.int/immunization_supply/
introduction/economics_vaccineproduction.pdf.
58
Zard, supra note 49, at 491.
59
See ANTHONY S. FAUCI ET AL., HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 760–
61 (14th ed. 1998).
60
Id. at 761 (“As products to be given to healthy individuals to prevent disease,
vaccines not only must be efficacious but also must lack the capacity to cause harm.”).
61
See id. at 760.
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of the arguments against patenting pharmaceuticals typically
address the exorbitant price associated with a patent and its effects
upon developing countries that are unable to afford these
treatments.62 The Doha Declaration, a proclamation issued by the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Ministerial Conference in
November 2001,63 articulates the argument against patenting
pharmaceuticals.64
The Doha Declaration underscores that
patented pharmaceuticals are sold at higher prices thus prohibiting
segments of the population from purchasing these patented
pharmaceuticals, which they cannot afford.65 In fact, the Doha
Declaration “extend[s] exemptions for pharmaceutical patent
protection for poor third world countries until 2016,”66 thereby
allowing citizens of developing countries to more readily access
drugs and other treatments to combat HIV and AIDS.67 In
response, those who support granting patents for pharmaceuticals
argue that maintaining the patent requirement would actually
benefit developing countries because they may be encouraged by
the economic incentives to develop their own pharmaceuticals.68

62

See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92 (“While wealthier nations would
have access to limited supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs, the poorer countries
would endure much higher fatality rates, due to lack of medical treatments.”); Sean
McElligott, Addressing Supply Side Barriers to Introduction of New Vaccines to the
Developing World, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 415, 415 (2009); Michael A. Santoro, Human
Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying Third World Access to
Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 923, 939 (2006).
63
Santoro, supra note 62, at 929–30. The Doha Declaration relates specifically to the
occurrence and treatment of AIDS in third world countries. See id. at 932–33.
64
See id. at 932–33.
65
See id. at 933.
66
See id. at 930.
67
See id. at 932–33 (“The principles enunciated [in the Doha Declaration] helped to
ameliorate a formidable obstacle—that is, high prices due to pharmaceutical patents—
preventing millions suffering from HIV/AIDS in the third world from obtaining access to
life-saving and life-enhancing drugs.”). However, despite the benefits that third world
countries gain from the Doha Declaration, they still have difficulties affording the
reduced prices of the drugs. Id. at 933. Even when these countries manage to obtain
these treatments, they encounter additional obstacles relating to the distribution of the
pharmaceuticals and a shortage of medical personnel to administer them. Id.
68
Santoro, supra note 62, at 928 (“[P]atents are not only good for corporate profits,
but also the adoption of strong IP laws would help third world countries to develop their
own high technology industries and products in the same manner that such laws spur
innovation in developed countries.”).
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There are, however, research and development costs associated
with creating a vaccine, specifically a vaccine in response to a
pandemic.69 These costs are augmented because countries lack a
supply of the needed vaccine at the inception of the pandemic.70 In
fact, commercial vaccine production typically does not occur until
approximately three to six months after the start of the pandemic.71
Moreover, as implied in the Doha Declaration, “manufacturing
capacity for influenza vaccines is overwhelmingly concentrated in
Europe and North America.”72 Therefore, it once again becomes
unlikely that “developing countries [will] have access to an
effective vaccine at an affordable price.”73 Furthermore, “current
production capacity—estimated at around 300 million doses of
trivalent seasonal vaccine per year—falls far below the demand
that will arise during a pandemic,”74 which will likely lead to
morality problems concerning the distribution of a scarce resource
during a public health emergency.75
Another argument that has been advanced in support of
patenting pharmaceutical inventions is “based on the view that
patents were the inventor’s ‘natural right’ or just reward for
inventive activity.”76 This argument is further supported by the
Patent Act, which provides the inventor with the right of
exclusivity over his creation.77 As is evidenced by the terms
“‘piracy’ and ‘stealing’”78 to describe copying pharmaceuticals
69
World Health Organization, Vaccine Research and Development: Current Status
(Nov. 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/vaccineresearch2005_11_3/
en/index.html.
70
See id. (“As a pandemic vaccine needs to be a close match to the actual pandemic
virus, commercial production cannot begin prior to emergence and characterization of the
pandemic virus.”).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See James Tabery & Charles Mackett, The Ethics of Triage in the Event of an
Influenza Pandemic, 2 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 2, 114 (2008).
76
Santoro, supra note 62, at 928–29.
77
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); Santoro, supra note 62, at 929 (“Others are
morally obliged to recognize the rights of inventors by not copying their creative ideas
without permission.”).
78
Santoro, supra note 62, at 929 (“Perhaps the most telling indicia of how successful
the pharmaceutical companies were in advancing this argument is the highly charged
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without permission from the company that initially created and
patented the treatment, these arguments proffered by the
pharmaceutical companies have been successful.79
Similar debates also arise regarding the morality of issuing
patents, particularly in relation to biotechnological innovations.80
These debates consider whether morality should be a component of
patent law.81 One argument notes that “the question of morality in
essence concerns the act of creating the technology and as such is
problematic within the patent system, since patent law is concerned
with protection of technology only.”82 Thus, this view implies
that, although morality and patents are both concerned with the
creation process, they are discrete disciplines with differing goals
and as such, morality should not be applied to patent law.83 Those
on the other side of the debate, however, contend that “opposing a
patent on moral grounds is tantamount to preventing the activity
altogether, by a withdrawal of the incentives to perform it, and
suggest[] that patent law is a component in regulating, albeit
indirectly, the creation of biotechnology.”84 This argument focuses
upon the economic incentives that may serve as motivations for

moral language that is now commonly used to describe situations when pharmaceutical
products are not accorded strong IP protection.”).
79
See id.
80
See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions:
The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 687 (2004)
(“If patent law is to remain relevant in this era of unprecedented biotechnological
advancement, the question arises as to whether patent examiners or courts should be able
to deny a patent application or invalidate patents they deem immoral.”). Much of the
morality debate surrounding patents relates to the disparities between developed countries
that produce the drugs and developing countries that require them. “For example, when
pharmaceutical corporations from wealthy industrialized nations charge exorbitant
amounts to individuals and public health systems in developing countries for medicine to
curb or cure otherwise terminal illnesses, such inflexibility . . . make[s] the development
of a universal intellectual property morality all but impossible to achieve.” John
Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the
Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 60 (2003). This morality consideration will not be
evaluated in this Note, which solely focuses upon the American patent system.
81
See OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINT AND
PATENT LAW 10 (2005).
82
Id.
83
See id.
84
Id.
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scientific researchers to engage in biotechnological innovations
that will ultimately benefit society.85
Despite the various arguments for and against invoking
morality when evaluating patents, the American legal system does
not require patent examiners to address the morality of patents.86
“However, aspects of some recent biotechnology cases could be
taken to indicate a limited place in the patent system for moral
norms suggesting that such considerations, albeit residual, continue
to apply.”87 Therefore, the evaluation of patents in the United
States does not require an analysis of the morality associated with
innovation, although morality concerns can be addressed in
discrete patent cases.
B. Health Care and Public Health Law
Public health law88 and the administration of health care to the
public must work in concert.89 This joint effort is especially
critical in the event of potentially life-threatening pandemics, such
as the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic.90 In this situation, public
health agencies and health care providers should work with the
government and with vaccine manufacturers to ensure adequate
public education, sufficient availability of the vaccine, and
efficient administration of the vaccine to the public.91 The FDA is
a key player in this effort because its approval is required before
the pharmaceutical companies can commence production and
distribution of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.92

85

See supra Part I.A.2.
See MILLS, supra note 81, at 173; Enerson, supra note 80, at 691–92.
87
MILLS, supra note 81, at 50.
88
Public health law is an expansive field that is composed of eight discrete disciplines:
environmental health law; regulation and reporting (surveillance) of disease and injury;
laws pertaining to vital statistics; disease and injury control; involuntary testing; contract
tracing; immunization and mandatory treatment; and personal restrictions.
89
See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza:
Ethics, Law and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 140 (2007).
90
See id. (noting that “constructive partnership among government, industry, and the
community can vastly improve survival and functioning in an impending crisis”).
91
See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
supra note 10.
92
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2010).
86
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Part I.B.1 provides an overview of public health law and
discusses the initiatives that public health organizations are
undertaking in order to ensure the health of the general public
during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic. Part I.B.2 explains the
significance of vaccines and describes how vaccines are unique
among other biologics.
1. Public Health Law
Several public health agencies are working in concert with
front-line medical personnel, the government, and pharmaceutical
companies in order to combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic.93 For example, public health agencies are actively
engaged in the surveillance of the spread of the swine flu
pandemic.94 In addition to tracking the spread of the 2009 H1N1
swine flu virus, public health agencies, such as the CDC and the
WHO, educate the public about the virus and encourage the public
to become immunized by obtaining the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.95
Pharmaceutical companies are involved in the public health
program by creating not only vaccines, which serve as preventative
measures against acquiring the illness,96 but also antiviral
medications to treat the condition.97 The federal government has
also devised a method that allows the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to

93

See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 140 (“Planning for an influenza pandemic
is vital to success . . . . [C]onstructive partnership among government, industry, and the
community can vastly improve survival and functioning in an impending crisis.”).
94
See, e.g., World Health Organization, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009—Update 74,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_11_13/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010);
World Health Organization, Timeline: Geographic Spread of Influenza Activity,
http://gamapserver.who.int/h1n1/geographic-spread/h1n1_geographic-spread.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2010).
95
See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10; WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
supra note 10.
96
See FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and Lot
Release, supra note 3.
97
See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and
Related Information, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm100228.htm#AntiviralMedications (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter FDA,
Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related Information] (“Antiviral drugs available by
prescription can also help to reduce the time it takes for symptoms to improve in
uncomplicated illness caused by [the] influenza virus, and are sometimes used in selected
situations to reduce the chance of influenza illness if people are exposed to influenza.”).
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become widely accessible to members of the general public by
financing individuals’ purchase of the vaccine.98 As part of its
pandemic preparedness efforts, the government has also been
stockpiling antiviral drugs, medications that can be administered to
patients following their exposure to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu.99
Doctors, nurses, and other health care practitioners are involved in
the administration of the vaccine and in prescribing the antiviral
medication.100 These practitioners also “play an essential role in
influencing the attitudes of patients regarding appropriate
immunization.”101
Public health strategies are “designed to reduce the
transmission of disease and to protect individuals from injury.”102
The CDC states that “[t]he single best way to protect against the
flu is to get vaccinated each year.”103 Likewise, regarding the
2009 H1N1 swine flu virus, the CDC and other public health
agencies are encouraging inoculation as the primary mode of
prevention.104 Since the initial supplies of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine
98
See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, NEWS N.Y. (MSSNY), Nov.
2009, at 12, available at http://www.mssny.org/mssnycfm/mssnyeditor/File/2009/
In_the_News/NONY/Nov_09/NONY-2009-11-web.pdf [hereinafter H1N1 Update on
Answers to Physician Questions]. “The US [sic] government is purchasing all the novel
H1N1 vaccine in this country and making it available to physicians and other healthcare
providers free of charge.” Id. In turn, individuals do not have to pay their health care
providers for the cost of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, but they are required to pay the cost
involved in administering it. Id.
99
See FDA, Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related Information, supra note 97.
Whereas the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is a preventative measure, antiviral medications are a
combative treatment measure designed to ameliorate symptoms of the disease. Id.
100
See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Information for
Clinicians and Health Care Professionals, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/
professional.htm#6 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
101
FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 769.
102
HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 869.
103
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Facts About Seasonal Flu Vaccine,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
104
See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Influenza
Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/public/vaccination_qa_pub.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine] (“The first and
most important step to prevent the flu is to get vaccinated.”); World Health Organization,
Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/
frequently_asked_questions/vaccine_preparedness/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2010) [hereinafter WHO, Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1)] (“Influenza vaccines are one
of the most effective ways to protect people from contracting illness during influenza
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were limited,105 another public health concern developed regarding
the distribution of a scarce resource.106 In turn, this concern
triggered a panoply of social, economic, and political
consequences relating to rationing the vaccine.107
In addition to providing the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, public health
agencies are also educating the public about alternative treatment
modalities.108 The CDC recommends antiviral drugs,109 such as
Tamiflu and Relenza, as a second line of defense to protect against
the symptoms of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus (the vaccine is its
recommended prevention for the flu).110 These two antiviral
medications can be administered to patients who have already
contracted the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus or have been recently
exposed to it.111 These antiviral treatments shorten the length of
time an individual is sick with the flu, lessen the severity of
symptoms, and can also prevent serious health complications.112
2. How Vaccines Differ from Other Pharmaceuticals
Vaccines are biologics composed of either “attenuated live or
killed microorganisms or antigenic portions of these agents . . .
[that] induce immunity and prevent disease.”113 Vaccines have

epidemics and pandemics. . . . The vaccines will boost immunity against the new
influenza, and help ensure public health as the pandemic evolves.”).
105
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104 (“When [a] vaccine to
protect against 2009 H1N1 first became available, supplies were limited.”).
106
See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92.
107
See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137–40.
108
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu
Season, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/antiviral.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
CDC, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu Season].
109
“Antiviral drugs are prescription medicines (pills, liquid or an inhaled powder) that
fight against the flu in your body.” CDC, 2009 H1N1 and Seasonal Flu: What You
Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/
freeresources/2009-10/pdf/Antiviral_H1N1_factsheet.pdf.
110
Id. Thus, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is administered in order to prevent individuals
from contracting the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus whereas antiviral medications are
prescribed to individuals who were exposed to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu and are
combating its symptoms. Id.
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 759.
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significant public health ramifications.114 Specifically, regarding
contagious diseases that spread from person to person, public
health authorities strive to maintain acceptable immunity levels
within the population. Achieving herd immunity, “a definable
prevalence of immunity in the population above which it becomes
difficult for the organism to circulate and reach new
susceptibles”115 lowers the incidence of new disease. Overall,
public health agencies have been successful in educating and
encouraging the general population to receive vaccines so as to
limit the occurrence of contagious diseases that are preventable by
vaccination.116
Yet, “vaccines must be developed, manufactured, and
distributed if they are to be used to protect public health.”117 This
process is composed of four discrete stages, which evaluate both
the efficacy and safety of the vaccine being produced.118 These
steps include animal studies to identify the protective antigen,
analysis of the antigen’s effect on the immune system, assessment
of the vaccine’s safety in human populations of various ages, and
an evaluation of the vaccine’s effectiveness in its target
population.119 In the United States, private pharmaceutical
companies, rather than governmental organizations, typically
create and manufacture vaccines.120
However, the production of flu vaccines is particularly
complex.121 Since new strains of the flu emerge each season, a
novel flu vaccine must be produced each year to combat the
114

See id. at 769. For example, “[t]he epidemiologically appropriate use of vaccines
has resulted in the global eradication of smallpox; the elimination of poliomyelitis in the
Americas; the virtual elimination of congenital rubella syndrome, tetanus, and diphtheria
in the United States; and a dramatic reduction in pertussis, rubella, measles, and mumps
in the United States.” Id. at 758.
115
Id. at 760. Public health agencies must continue to monitor the spread of a
contagious illness even after herd immunity is achieved within a population. See id. at
769. Furthermore, future generations must also be vaccinated if the illness continues to
circulate. See id.
116
See id. at 769.
117
HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 894.
118
FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760.
119
See id. at 760–61.
120
HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 894.
121
See FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760.
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seasonal flu.122 Flu vaccine production was unique during 2009
because rather than producing one seasonal flu vaccine,
pharmaceutical companies also produced a second vaccine to
combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.123 In addition to educating
the public about the vaccine itself, public health agencies also
informed the public that the 2009 flu season may pose a greater
public health threat than the one normally encountered in a typical
flu season.124 The modification was necessary because the 2009
H1N1 swine flu was likely to lead to more serious health risks in
pregnant women and in individuals who are twenty-five years of
age and under when compared to the typical seasonal influenza.125
C. 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu
Swine flu is a type of influenza virus that infects humans,
although the virus itself originates in pigs.126 Swine flu symptoms
are similar to those of a typical seasonal flu.127 The symptoms of
the 2009 H1N1 swine flu “include fever, cough, sore throat, runny
122
See id. (“Influenza virus, characterized biologically by its antigenic drift,
periodically emerges in a new antigenic version capable of causing a global pandemic for
which a new vaccine must be rapidly devised, produced, and distributed.”).
123
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104. The availability of two
vaccines, each providing inoculation against a different strain of flu, resulted in the need
for public health agencies to educate the population about the difference between these
vaccines. See id. Moreover, public health agencies notified the general public that in
order to receive immunity to both forms of the flu circulating during the 2009 flu season,
they must receive two separate vaccinations. Id.
124
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/season/current-season.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter CDC, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season]. “There is concern that the 2009
H1N1 virus may cause the season to be worse than a regular flu season—with a lot more
people getting sick, being hospitalized and dying than during a regular flu season.”
Adraenne Bowe, How to Avoid the Swine Flu This Season, ADVOCATE, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.gcadvocate.com/2009/10/how-to-avoid-the-swine-flu-this-season10/.
125
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and
You, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter CDC,
2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You].
126
Id.
127
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the
Situation, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/background.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation] (“Novel H1N1
infection has been reported to cause a wide range of flu-like symptoms, including fever,
cough, sore throat, body aches, headaches, chills and fatigue. In addition, many people
also have reported nausea, vomiting and/or diarrhea.”).
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or stuffy nose, body aches, headache, chills and fatigue.”128
However, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus differs from the typical
seasonal flu virus.129 For example, the 2009 “novel H1N1 virus
preferentially infects younger people . . . under the age of 25
years.”130 This particular targeting does not occur with typical flu
viruses that infect all ages of the population with an increased
frequency among the elderly.131 Furthermore, it should be noted
that between one-third and one-half of the fatal 2009 H1N1 swine
flu episodes have occurred in healthy individuals132 whereas the
typical seasonal flu primarily results in death among the frail or
elderly populations.133 The typical flu season in the United States
spans from late November through March134 whereas swine flu can
develop on a more erratic time table.135 For example, in 2009,
swine flu was first detected in the United States in April,136 after
the conclusion of the typical flu season.137 The CDC states that
annual vaccination is the best mode of prevention against acquiring
the seasonal flu.138 Similarly, a vaccine has been created in order
to prevent the spread of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.139

128

CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125.
See generally id.; CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54; CDC, The Flu Season,
supra note 55.
130
Chan, supra note 1, at 2.
131
See id.
132
See id. (“Around one third to half of the severe and fatal [swine flu] infections are
occurring in previously healthy young and middle-aged people.”).
133
See id.
134
See CDC, The Flu Season, supra note 55.
135
See CDC, 2009–10 Influenza (Flu) Season, supra note 124.
136
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125.
137
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008–2009 Influenza Season Week
15 Ending April 18, 2009 (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weekly
archives2008-2009/weekly15.htm. During the week of April 12 to 18, 2009, the seasonal
flu decreased to only a 6.2% occurrence in the United States. Id. On April 15, 2009, that
same week, the CDC confirmed the first case of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu strain in the
United States. CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation, supra note 127.
“[I]n the United States, significant novel H1N1 illness has continued into the summer,
with localized and in some cases intense outbreaks occurring.” Id.
138
CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54.
139
CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104. “Vaccines are the most
powerful public health tool for control of influenza, and the U.S. government worked
closely with manufacturers to take steps in the process to manufacture a 2009 H1N1
vaccine.” HAW. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2009 H1N1 INFLUENZA VACCINE FREQUENTLY
129

C07_KAPLAN_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/12/2010 4:58 PM

[Vol. 20:991

This section of the Note analyzes the history of the swine flu in
the United States as well as the preventative measures that can be
taken to combat this strain of influenza. Part I.C.1 summarizes the
2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic. Part I.C.2 depicts the previous
swine flu outbreaks in the United States, which occurred in 1918
and in 1976. Part I.C.3 illustrates the series of events associated
with the 1976 swine flu vaccine. Finally, Part I.C.4 describes the
current swine flu vaccine that is intended to combat the 2009
H1N1 swine flu.
1. The Current 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic
On June 11, 2009, the WHO declared a global swine flu
pandemic.140 The WHO’s proclamation concomitantly raised the
pandemic alert to a Phase 6 level, which reflects the global nature
of the disease.141 Generally, “[a]n influenza pandemic can be
defined as a global epidemic of influenza and it occurs when a new
influenza virus (i.e. an influenza virus subtype that is not
circulating widely in human beings) emerges and starts spreading
in a similar way to normal influenza—through coughing and
sneezing.”142 Since humans have not been previously exposed to
the specific virus, they do not possess the requisite immunity to

ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) 1 (2009), available at http://hawaii.gov/health/about/reports/
H1N1_FAQ_forWEB.pdf.
140
Chan, supra note 1, at 1. WHO data reveals that on June 11, 2009, there were
28,774 reported cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu that occurred in 74 countries. World
Health Organization, Influenza A(H1N1)—Update 47 (June 11, 2009), http://www.who.
int/csr/don/2009_06_11/en. Of those cases, 144 resulted in death. Id.
141
Chan, supra note 1, at 1. “Phases 1–3 [of the WHO phases of pandemic alerts]
correlate with preparedness, including capacity development and response planning
activities, while Phases 4–6 clearly signal the need for response and mitigation efforts.”
World Health Organization, Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert, http://www.who.
int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/print.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). Phase 6
is the pandemic phase, which is defined as “human-to-human spread of the virus into at
least two countries in one WHO region . . . [and] by community level outbreaks in at least
one other country in a different WHO region.” Id. It should be noted that the WHO
elevated the pandemic alert to Phase 6 in response to the spread of the 2009 H1N1 swine
flu and not due to the severity of the disease. CDC, Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the
Situation, supra note 127.
142
World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, http://www.euro.who.int/
influenza/20080618_20 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter WHO, Regional Office
for Europe].
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fight the novel flu virus that has emerged and thus are affected by
the symptoms of the disease.143
This lack of human immunity to pandemic influenzas, like the
2009 H1N1 swine flu virus, causes those who “contract pandemic
influenza . . . to experience [a] more serious disease than that
caused by normal influenza.”144 Moreover, the 2009 H1N1 swine
flu is not a typical human flu and according to the WHO, the
current virulent strain of the swine flu that triggered the pandemic
has never infected humans in the past.145 Furthermore, although
this strain is referred to as the swine flu, it is actually a “quadruple
reassortant” virus composed of “two genes from flu viruses that
normally circulate in pigs in Europe and Asia and bird (avian)
genes and human genes.”146
This particular swine flu outbreak, which is caused by the 2009
H1N1 swine flu strain, originated in Mexico in March 2009,
toward the end of Mexico’s annual flu season.147 However,
143

FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 760 (“[A]n individual is susceptible to all serotypes
against which he or she lacks [an] antibody.”).
144
WHO, Regional Office for Europe, supra note 142.
145
See Chan, supra note 1, at 1 (“In late April, WHO announced the emergence of a
novel influenza A virus . . . . The virus is entirely new, the virus is contagious, spreading
easily from one person to another, and from one country to another.”).
146
CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125 (“This virus was
originally referred to as ‘swine flu’ because laboratory testing showed that many of the
genes in this new virus were very similar to influenza that normally occur in pigs (swine)
in North America. But further study has shown that this new virus is very different from
what normally circulates in North American pigs.”).
147
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/27questions.html [hereinafter
McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions]. A separate spike in cases of the
seasonal flu toward the end of the annual influenza season generally indicates that “B
strain flus peak[ed] later in the season.” Id. However, B strain flus are mild flus and
would not have created the severe illness observed in Mexico. Id. Edgar Hernandez, a
five year old Mexican boy, was the first to be infected with this novel swine flu. Marc
Lacey, From Edgar, 5, Coughs Heard Round the World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at
A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E2DC133CF93AA
15757C0A96F9C8B63. Hernandez has since recovered from the illness. Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/27questions.html
[hereinafter McNeil, W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with Advice]. It is
interesting to note that Edgar Hernandez resides in La Gloria, a Mexican town with a
large pig farming industry. Id. However, a spokesperson for the pig farming plant
claimed that all of its pigs were vaccinated against the flu and none of its workers

C07_KAPLAN_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1016

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/12/2010 4:58 PM

[Vol. 20:991

Mexican authorities did not detect the peak in respiratory disease
and death until early April 2009.148 At that time, Mexican
authorities sent samples of the virus to the United States for
assistance in classifying the new disease149 because only two
laboratories possessed the reagents necessary to identify this novel
flu strain.150
By April 24, 2009, there were seven confirmed cases of 2009
H1N1 swine flu in the United States151 and nine suspected cases.152
Three days later, on April 27, 2009, the first swine flu death
occurred in the United States.153 It should be noted, though, that
the first death from the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in the United States
involved a 23-month old boy who resided in Mexico City.154 The
child was visiting family in Brownsville, Texas, a town located
near the Mexican border, when he began to experience symptoms
of the virus.155 Thus, it is possible that this child contracted the
2009 H1N1 swine flu while he was in Mexico rather than in the
United States. The toddler spent two weeks at Texas Children’s
Hospital in Houston before dying from this disease.156

contracted swine flu before Hernandez had gotten sick with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
virus. Id.
148
McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, supra note 147.
149
Id. (“[The Mexicans] ask[ed] for help genotyping the new virus.”).
150
Id. These laboratories are the CDC laboratory located in Atlanta and the Canadian
National Laboratory in Winnipeg, Canada. Id. The CDC developed a test kit for
identifying the 2009 H1N1 swine flu, which it sent to other states and countries to enable
them to diagnose swine flu. McNeil, W.H.O. Issues Higher Alert on Swine Flu, with
Advice, supra note 147. It is possible that this increase in testing for the 2009 H1N1
swine flu in various locations worldwide “could lead to a sharp increase in confirmed
cases.” Id.
151
World Health Organization, Influenza-like Illness in the United States and Mexico
(Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en.
Of the first seven
confirmed cases of 2009 H1N1 swine flu in the United States, five occurred in California
and two arose in Texas. Id.
152
Id.
153
See James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexican Child Visiting U.S. 1st to Die Here of Swine
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A14, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9805E4DF1731F933A05757C0A96F9C8B63.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
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Following the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in
Mexico, the next major outbreak occurred in New York City.157
The initial cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu in New York were all
connected to Saint Francis Preparatory School in Fresh Meadows,
Queens.158 Both hospital and city officials in New York noted the
overwhelming influx of emergency room visits during the spring
of 2009.159 “On May 25, the worst day of the spring outbreak,
2,500 people visited emergency rooms in the city complaining of
influenza-like illness . . . . The number on the same day last year
was 150.”160 New York hospital and city officials also identified a
direct correlation between the daily number of hospital visits and
the news about 2009 H1N1 swine flu deaths and school
closings.161 Despite the dramatic increase in the numbers of
people seeking emergency room care, however, only forty to fifty

157

Anemona Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares for a Resurgence of Swine
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/21/nyregion/21flu.html [hereinafter Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares
for a Resurgence of Swine Flu].
As of July 7, 909 New Yorkers had been hospitalized with swine flu
and 47 had died, a fraction of the 1,000 deaths in New York
attributed to influenza each year. City officials estimate that 7
percent to 10 percent of New Yorkers, or 580,000 to 830,000 people,
had contracted the H1N1 virus, but most had only mild symptoms. A
seasonal flu is usually contracted by 5 percent to 20 percent of the
population.
Id. According to Dr. Thomas A. Farley, the City Health Commissioner, 930 people were
hospitalized with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu and 54 people died of the swine flu in New
York. Sewell Chan & Lisa W. Foderaro, This Time, City Says It’s Ready for Swine Flu,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04EEDD
143DF931A3575AC0A96F9C8B63. A survey conducted by the city’s health department
indicates that between 750,000 and 1 million New Yorkers suffered from the swine flu in
the spring of 2009. Id.
158
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency over Swine Flu,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, http://travel.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu.html.
159
See Hartocollis, Lesson Learned, City Prepares for a Resurgence of Swine Flu,
supra note 157.
160
Id.
161
See id. (“Visits to emergency rooms began to rise sharply on May 16, the day after
the first news reports that an assistant principal in Queens had been hospitalized with
swine flu. The assistant principal, Mitchell Wiener, died on May 17, and another spike in
hospital visits followed.”).
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people were actually hospitalized during the worst points of the
outbreak in May 2009.162
Although the 2009 H1N1 swine flu spread rapidly, the
Director-General of the WHO stated that “the overwhelming
majority of patients experience mild symptoms and make a rapid
and full recovery—often in the absence of any form of medical
treatment.”163 Initially, health officials claimed that the majority of
the people who developed severe reactions to the 2009 H1N1
swine flu also suffered from other pre-existing conditions.164
However, new studies have revealed that among 1,400 hospitalized
adults, 46% did not suffer from any pre-existing or chronic
conditions.165
Moreover, health officials remain concerned because
“[p]andemic flus—like the 1918 flu and outbreaks in 1957 and
1968—often strike young, healthy people the hardest.”166 This
phenomenon occurs because the immune response itself in these
healthy adults is so intense that rather than solely combating the
virus, the violent immune system response also leads to severe
pathological ramifications, including death.167 Experts believe that
older people may have acquired some immunity to the 2009 H1N1

162

See id. (“[I]n an indication of the large number of what doctors call the ‘worried
well,’ only 40 to 50 people a day were hospitalized during the worst stretch of that
month, records show.”).
163
Chan, supra note 1, at 1–2.
164
See Mike Stobbe, Near Half of Swine Flu Patients Otherwise Healthy, ABC NEWS,
Oct. 13, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=8818376. In a study of 272
patients who were hospitalized with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu for at least a 24 hour
period, 83% of the adults and 60% of the children evaluated also suffered from preexisting conditions. Seema Jain, M.D. et al., Hospitalized Patients with 2009 H1N1
Influenza in the United States, April-June 2009, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1935, 1935, 1937
(2009), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa0906695. Asthma
was the most common pre-existing condition observed among these 272 patients. Id. at
1937.
165
See Stobbe, supra note 164.
166
McNeil, Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions, supra note 147. “Unlike typical
flu seasons, when infants and the aged are usually the most vulnerable, none of the initial
deaths in Mexico were in people older than 60 or younger than 3 years old, a
spokeswoman with the World Health Organization said.” Id.
167
See id. (“When a new virus emerges, deaths may occur in healthy adults who mount
the strongest immune reactions. Their own defenses—inflammation and leaking fluid in
lung cells—can essentially drown them from inside.”).
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swine flu due to their exposure to other similar viruses during their
lifetime.168
President Obama and his administration warned Americans
that “‘[t]he potential for a significant outbreak [of the 2009 H1N1
swine flu] in the fall is looming.’”169 During the spring, summer,
and early fall of 2009, biologics and pharmaceuticals were created
in order to combat this influenza virus.170 The 2009 H1N1 vaccine
is considered the most effective way to avoid contracting the 2009
H1N1 swine flu.171 However, antiviral medications, such as
Tamiflu or Relenza, are also available to both out-patients and to
those hospitalized with either confirmed or suspected cases of
swine flu.172 These antiviral drugs reduce both the severity and the
duration of the illness in patients afflicted with swine flu.173

168

See Stobbe, supra note 164.
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A18, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9D07E3DF103CF933A25754C0A96F9C8B63 [hereinafter McNeil, Obama Warns
of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall] (“The Obama administration warned Americans . . . to
be ready for an aggressive return of the swine flu virus in the fall.”). However, an
alternative theory, which set forth three arguments, postulated that the 2009 H1N1 swine
flu is not likely to be “abnormally lethal” during the fall of 2009. Editorial, Preparing for
the Swine Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/
opinion/01tue1.html?_r=1 [hereinafter Editorial, Preparing for the Swine Flu]. This
theory began by noting the “encouragingly low death rate” in the spring of 2009, wherein
only 54 people died of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu among approximately 800,000 New
Yorkers who contracted the virus. Id. The theory’s second principle stated that “the virus
has not become more virulent as it wends its way around the world,” which implied that
the fall 2009 outbreak should not be more severe than the outbreak that occurred this past
spring. Id. Finally, this theory underscored that the “Bush administration and Congress
invested heavily in planning and in stockpiling medicines and medical supplies to fight a
feared avian flu pandemic that never materialized, and the Obama administration has
continued the effort. The same medicines should work against the swine flu virus.” Id.
170
See generally CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, supra note 125.
171
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine, supra note 104. Part I.C.4 of this Note
will discuss the current 2009 H1N1 swine flu vaccine.
172
See CDC, Antiviral Drugs, 2009–2010 Flu Season, supra note 108 (recommending
that physicians “prioritize use of these drugs for those patients who are severely ill (such
as those who are hospitalized) and those patients who are ill with influenza-like illness
and who are higher risk for influenza related complications”).
173
See id. (“[T]hese drugs can reduce the severity of flu symptoms and shorten the time
you are sick by 1 or 2 days.”). Three cases of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu were detected
where the virus was resistant to Tamiflu. McNeil, Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu
in the Fall, supra note 169. “Health officials said that they were aware of fears that a
169
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2. Previous Swine Flu Outbreaks in the United States—1918
and 1976
A previous swine flu pandemic swept the world in 1918.174
The 1918 influenza, also known as the Spanish flu,175 infected
approximately one-third of the world’s population (estimated to be
roughly 500 million people in 1918)176 and killed between 50 and
100 million people.177 The morbidity and mortality phenomenon
observed during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus outbreak reflects
that of the Spanish flu, where the “absolute risk of influenza death
was higher in those [younger than] 65 years of age than in those
[older than] 65.”178 Therefore, it becomes apparent that the impact
of the Spanish flu virus extended beyond 1918 because future
swine flu outbreaks exhibited the same morbidity and mortality
pattern. It should also be noted that “[a]ll influenza A pandemics
since that time . . . have been caused by descendants of the 1918

Tamiflu-resistant strain of the virus was already spreading silently in the United States,
but that they had not seen evidence that it was a threat.” Id.
174
See generally Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The
Mother of All Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no01/pdfs/05-0979.pdf (citing a brief history of the
1918 Spanish flu pandemic in order to illustrate the potential severity of the 2009 H1N1
swine flu virus). There were two additional influenza pandemics in the twentieth
century. Robert B. Belshe, M.D., The Origins of Pandemic Inflenza—Lessons from the
1918 Virus, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2209, 2209 (2005), available at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/353/21/2209.pdf. Asian influenza occurred in 1957
with the H2N2 virus, and the Hong Kong influenza occurred in 1968 with the H3N2
virus. Id. These two influenza pandemics were not caused by the H1N1 virus and will
not be discussed in this Note.
175
Nicholas Bakalar, How (and How Not) to Battle Flu: A Tale of 23 Cities, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at F5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/health/
17flu.html?scp=2&sq=%22spanish%20flu%22&st=cse.
176
Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 15.
177
Id. (“Total deaths were estimated at 50 million and were arguably as high as 100
million.”).
178
See id. at 15, 19. Furthermore, “[n]early half of the [1918] influenza-related deaths .
. . were in young adults 20–40 years of age.” Id. at 19. Similarly, the WHO noted that
“[m]ost cases of severe and fatal infections have been in adults between the ages of 30
and 50 years.” Chan, supra note 1, at 2. To this end, the CDC established a priority list
of individuals who should receive the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, which prioritizes individuals
between the ages of 25 and 64 years old. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendation, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/
acip.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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virus,” except for those caused by avian viruses.179 The 2009
H1N1 swine flu virus has been found to be a descendent of the
Spanish flu virus, and is composed of “key genes from the 1918
virus.”180 Like the Spanish flu, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu is caused
by the H1N1 A strain, which may explain the similar morbidity
and mortality patterns observed during both pandemics.181
Another swine flu outbreak, which began in January 1976, was
detected on an army base in Fort Dix, New Jersey.182 By the end
of January 1976, 155 cases of swine flu were reported at the Fort
Dix base.183 No cases of the 1976 swine flu were reported
anywhere else in the United States.184
Following the death of an army private, initial concern arose
because a young, healthy individual is not typically expected to die
from the flu.185 Subsequently, the CDC tested blood samples from
the deceased and determined that he in fact had contracted swine
flu.186 Specifically, the CDC found that the army private’s
“immune system had developed antibodies to a strain of flu similar
to the Spanish influenza of 1918. That particular strain of swine
flu produced the worst human pandemic of the 20th century.”187
This discovery caused CDC scientists and researchers to worry that

179

Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 15. The H5N1 and H7N7 viruses are
the two main examples of avian viruses that caused human infections. These viruses are
not descendants of the 1918 virus. Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. The 2009 H1N1 swine flu is caused by the (A)H1N1 strain. Id. Therefore, there
is further reason to suspect that the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic could be as virulent
as the 1918 flu pandemic.
182
David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination
Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 29 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no01/pdfs/05-0979.pdf. This Note will analyze the
vaccine that was developed in order to combat the 1976 H1N1 swine flu. See infra Part
I.C.3.
183
Patrick Di Justo, The Last Great Swine Flu Epidemic, SALON, Apr. 28, 2009,
http://www.salon.com/env/feature/2009/04/28/1976_swine_flu (“By the end of January,
155 soldiers at Fort Dix reported positive for swine flu antibodies. None of the soldiers’
families or co-workers, however, had been exposed to the virus; all of the reported swine
flu cases had been limited to the soldiers in . . . [the] camp.”).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
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another pandemic could result.188 Government officials shared
these concerns: “When studies showed a viral infection similar to
the one responsible for the 1918–1919 Swine Flu pandemic,
President Ford (and others) urged the appropriation of emergency
funds for a nationwide influenza immunization program.”189
3. The 1976 Swine Flu Vaccine
Fear that the 1976 swine flu would imitate the 1918 Spanish flu
by infecting and killing a significant proportion of the world’s
population prompted the United States to develop a swine flu
vaccine.190 However, it is necessary to underscore that “even with
modern antiviral and antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and prevention
knowledge, the return of a pandemic virus equivalent in
pathogenicity to the virus of 1918 would likely kill [more than]
100 million people worldwide.”191
On March 13, 1976, the director of the CDC, concerned about
a swine flu pandemic, “asked Congress for money to develop and
test enough swine flu vaccine to immunize at least 80 percent of
the population of the United States, believed to be the minimum
needed to avoid an epidemic.”192 Although the director of the
CDC set forth four possible proposals regarding actions in
response to the swine flu, the CDC recommended that the federal
government contract directly with pharmaceutical companies so
that an adequate amount of vaccine could be produced to
immunize the population.193 The CDC also suggested that the
188

Id. (“If [the soldiers at the Fort Dix base] had been exposed to something like the
1918 flu virus, the world could be in for an extensive and lethal outbreak.”).
189
Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 BYU L. REV. 69,
69.
190
Id. (“When studies showed a viral infection similar to the one responsible for the
1918–1919 Swine Flu pandemic, President Ford (and others) urged the appropriation of
emergency funds for a nationwide influenza immunization program.”).
191
Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 174, at 21.
192
Di Justo, supra note 183.
193
See Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 30. The first proposal offered by the
director of the CDC was to allow the market to operate as usual on the assumption that a
swine flu pandemic might not result in 1976. Id. The director’s second suggestion, which
was ultimately selected, recommended that the federal government “embark on a major
program to immunize a highly susceptible population” by contracting with
pharmaceutical companies that would develop and produce the requisite amount of swine
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“federal government . . . make grants to state health departments to
organize and conduct immunization programs . . . [and] provide
vaccines to state health departments and private medical
practices.”194 President Ford accepted this proposal that involved
both a federal and state government response.195 Thus, the
National Influenza Immunization Program was created.196
During production of the 1976 swine flu vaccine, the
pharmaceutical companies posed an ultimatum wherein they
required that “the federal government indemnify them against
claims of adverse reactions as a requirement for release of the
vaccine.”197 The government acquiesced and developed the Swine
Flu Act,198 which assured the manufacturers of the 1976 swine flu
flu vaccines. Id. The third proposal was a “minimal response, in which the federal
government would contract for sufficient vaccine to provide to traditional healthcare
beneficiaries—military personnel, Native Americans, and Medicare-eligible persons.” Id.
The final alternative suggested an exclusively federal response without involving the
state governments. Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. The CDC created a new unit to implement the National Influenza Immunization
Program. Id. This unit:
was responsible for relations with state and local health departments
(including administration of the grant program for state operations,
technical advice to the procurement staff for vaccine, and
warehousing and distribution of the vaccine to state health
departments) and established a proactive system of surveillance for
possible adverse effects of the influenza vaccine.
Id. at 30–31.
197
Id. at 31. It should be noted that:
the legislation completely absolved program participants from any
claims of strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts but not as to claims based on common law
negligence. This provision tended to alleviate the most serious
liability concern of the vaccine manufacturers and required that they
obtain insurance covering their liability arising from negligence.
David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 147, 200 (2005).
198
See generally National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94380, 90 Stat. 1113. This statute is
[a]n Act to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the
establishment and implementation of an emergency national swine
flu immunization program and to provide an exclusive remedy for
personal injury or death arising out of the manufacture, distribution,
or administration of the swine flu vaccine under such program.
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vaccine that “lawsuits against the government [were] the exclusive
remedy for all actions connected with the Swine Flu program.”199
One commentator notes: “While the manufacturers’ ultimatum
reflected the trend of increased litigiousness in American society,
its unintended, unmistakable subliminal message blared ‘There’s
something wrong with this vaccine.’”200
The Swine Flu Act also contained a provision requiring “the
development . . . and implementation of a written informed consent
form and procedures for assuring that the risks and benefits from
the swine flu are fully explained to each individual to whom such a
vaccine is to be administered.”201 Of note, the consent form did
not disclose a warning about the possibility of contracting
Guillain-Barré syndrome, a severely debilitating neurological
disorder.202
The swine flu vaccine became available to the public on
October 1, 1976.203 By October 11, 1976, only ten days after the
immunization program commenced, approximately forty million
people received the swine flu vaccine.204 That evening, three
elderly Americans died shortly after receiving the swine flu
vaccine at the same clinic in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.205 Several
weeks later, “reports appeared of Guillain-Barré syndrome, a
paralyzing neuromuscular disorder, among some people who had
Id.
199

Appel, supra note 189, at 70.
Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31. The indemnification caused “public
misperception, warranted or not, [which] ensured that every coincidental health event that
occurred in the wake of the swine flu shot would be scrutinized and attributed to the
vaccine.” Id.
201
National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113. Subsequent lawsuits held that the vaccine manufacturer “had a duty to warn [the
vaccine consumer] . . . and that the warning was inadequate to discharge its duty.
Administered without an adequate warning, the swine flu vaccine was defective, hence
unreasonably dangerous.” Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1441 (8th Cir. 1984).
202
Appel, supra note 189, at 71. Guillain-Barré syndrome, “an acute demyelinating
polyneuropathy,” is manifested by a motor paralysis that may also be associated with
sensory loss. FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 2462. In severe cases, patients are unable to
breathe on their own. Id. The mortality rate associated with Guillain-Barré syndrome is
3–4%. Id. More than 85% of patients make a complete recovery. Id.
203
Di Justo, supra note 183.
204
Id.
205
Id.
200
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received swine flu immunizations.”206 This incidence of GuillainBarré syndrome required epidemiologists to analyze whether there
was a causal connection between the appearance of the
neurological condition and the 1976 swine flu vaccine.207 The
overall consensus among epidemiologists was that the number of
cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome among swine flu vaccine
recipients was in excess of what could be attributed to chance
alone.208 Once a causal connection linked the 1976 swine flu
vaccine to Guillain-Barré syndrome, the National Influenza
Immunization Program was stopped in December 1976.209
Ironically, the 1976–1977 “flu season was the most flu-free since
records had been kept . . . . The Great Swine Flu Epidemic of
1976 never took place.”210

206
Id. Forty-five deaths are claimed to have occurred as a result of Guillain-Barré
syndrome. Appel, supra note 189, at 72.
207
Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31.
Because [Guillain-Barré syndrome] cases are always present in the
population, the necessary public health questions concerning the
cases among vaccine recipients were “Is the number of cases of
[Guillain-Barré syndrome] among vaccine recipients higher than
would be expected? And if so, are the increased cases the result of
increased surveillance or a true increase?”
Id.
208
See id.
209
Appel, supra note 189, at 72.
Had H1N1 influenza been transmitted at that time, the small apparent
risk of [Guillain-Barré syndrome] from immunization would have
been eclipsed by the obvious immediate benefit of vaccine-induced
protection against swine flu. However, in December 1976, with
[more than] 40 million persons immunized and no evidence of H1N1
transmission, federal health officials decided that the possibility of an
association of [Guillain-Barré syndrome] with the vaccine, however
small, necessitated stopping immunization . . . .
Sencer & Millar, supra note 182, at 31.
210
Di Justo, supra note 183. By December 1979, a total of 912 lawsuits were filed in
the United States as a result of the National Influenza Immunization Program. Appel,
supra note 189, at 72. “Four hundred and ninety-four of the claimants allege GuillainBarr[é] syndrome, 121 allege other neurological disorders, and 252 claim
nonneurological disorders.” Id.
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4. The 2009 H1N1 Vaccine
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine was created to combat the 2009 H1N1
swine flu virus.211 This vaccine does not provide immunity against
the seasonal flu virus.212 The FDA granted approval to five
separate pharmaceutical companies—Novartis Vaccines and
Diagnostics Ltd., MedImmune LLC, CSL Ltd., Sanofi Pasteur,
Inc., and ID Biomedical Corporation of Quebec—to market their
version of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in the United States.213 The
vaccine is available in two forms, an injection that consists of the
inactive virus and a nasal spray that is composed of the live virus
in a weakened state.214
The government purchased 250 million doses of the 2009
H1N1 vaccine.215 The government provided a supply of these
vaccines to health care providers for administration to the
public.216 In exchange for receiving the vaccines at no cost, these
health care providers were permitted to charge patients only for the
cost of administering the vaccine and not for the vaccine itself.217
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine was first released on October 5,
2009.218 Approximately one month after its release, the United
States began experiencing a swine flu vaccine shortage.219 The
211

CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3. “About two weeks
after vaccination, antibodies that provide protection against 2009 H1N1 influenza virus
infection will develop in the body.” Id.
212
Id.
213
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent,
http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm181950.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
214
CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3.
215
See CDC, 65 and Older, supra note 18.
216
See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12.
217
See id. at 12–13; Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/
vaccination/vcost.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
218
Anemona Hartocollis, Vaccine Here, Swine Flu Fear Creates a Rush, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/nyregion/06
vaccine.html?scp=12&sq=swine%20flu%20vaccine&st=cse.
219
Donald J. McNeil, Jr., Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/health/05
flu.html?scp=2&sq=vaccine&st=cse [hereinafter McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine
Shortage for Seasonal Flu]. Anthony S. Fauci, the Director of the National Institute for
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, explained this shortage based upon “the inexorable
connection between preparedness for pandemic flu and preparedness for seasonal flu.” Id.
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shortage is expected to increase as the flu season progresses.220
However, major health complications, including Guillain-Barré
syndrome which was a devastating side effect of the 1976 H1N1
vaccine, have not been reported thus far in association with the
2009 H1N1 vaccine.221
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH
GOALS
This section discusses the inherent conflict between the
incentives included in patent rights and the primary goals of public
health. Part A addresses the conflict between the exclusive rights
granted by patents and the public health concerns relating to
widespread disease prevention. Part B describes the response of
the United States government to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic, critiques this response, and proposes alternative
solutions.
A. Patents’ Exclusivity Versus Public Health Disease Prevention
The goals and underlying purpose of patent law often conflict
with the basic tenets of public health law. The primary purpose of
patent law is to provide the patent holder with the right of market
exclusivity for the patent term.222 Thus, if a 2009 H1N1 vaccine
manufacturer is granted a patent, this pharmaceutical company
would simultaneously gain market exclusivity over the novel

(internal quotations omitted). Thus, the total flu vaccine production, which included both
swine flu and seasonal flu, was predicted to be inadequate because of the “raised demand
[which is] beyond what manufacturers can make in a year.” Id.
220
See id.
221
See Lauran Neergaard, New Group Helps US Monitor Swine Flu Shot Safety, ABC
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=8971742 (“Initial
reports to a . . . government database—where anyone can report any symptom, and
serious ones get intense investigation—showed nothing unusual after the first 10 million
vaccinations . . . . Most reports were of sore arms and fever, plus some flu symptoms that
suggested people already were infected when they got the shot, too late for it to help.”);
see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, General Questions and Answers on
2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/
vaccine_safety_qa.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
222
See Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130.
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vaccine for the duration of the patent, twenty years from the date
the patent application was filed.223
One of the primary concerns of public health agencies involves
disease prevention.224 Therefore, “countermeasures to impede
transmission”225 of contagious diseases are a high priority within
the realm of public health. Thus, public health interventions
include preventative measures, such as vaccination.226 Indeed,
public health agencies, such as the CDC and WHO, recommend
that people obtain the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, which serves as
inoculation against the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus.227 In addition
to recommending that people obtain the vaccine, these public
health agencies also provide other less invasive recommendations
to combat the current swine flu pandemic.228 These additional
recommendations that are offered to the general public in order to
minimize exposure to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu include washing
one’s hands with soap and water, covering one’s nose and mouth
when coughing or sneezing, and avoiding direct contact with one’s
eyes, nose, and mouth.229
At first glance, it may appear that patent law and public health
goals are compatible. In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Eldred v. Ashcroft,230 which concerns copyright law, can be
extrapolated to “indicate that a patent’s purpose always has been
and continues to be to advance a public good through the conferral
of a limited private economic privilege.”231 This promise of
223

See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, H1N1 Flu Vaccine—Why the Delay?,
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/H1N1VaccineDelay/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (“A flu
vaccine is the single best way to protect against influenza illness. . . . [A] 2009 H1N1
vaccine . . . protect[s] against the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus (sometimes called ‘swine
flu’).”); WHO, Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1), supra note 104 (“Influenza vaccines are
one of the most effective ways to protect people from contracting illness during influenza
epidemics and pandemics. . . . The vaccines will boost immunity against the new
influenza, and help ensure public health as the pandemic evolves.”).
228
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10.
229
See id.
230
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
231
Wamstad, supra note 6, at 130.
224
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exclusivity inherent in the patent motivates scientists to invent,
which in turn results in novel technology that is able to “advance a
public good”232 by allowing society to benefit from this new
creation.233 Likewise, public health agencies attempt to advance
the public good by providing health interventions and other
preventative measures that will curtail the spread and negative
impact of disease.234 Thus, it seems that both patent law and
public health policies seek to advance the public good.
However, an inherent conflict exists between the incentives
included in patent rights, such as providing the inventor with
financial rewards by guaranteeing an exclusive patent,235 and the
public health goal of making the vaccine widely accessible to the
general population.236 Specifically, segments of the population
may be unable to afford the cost of patented vaccines.237 Thus, a
subset of the population may be less likely to receive inoculation
and thereby would become more susceptible to the 2009 H1N1
swine flu illness, for example.238 In light of this public health
issue, questions arise regarding whether the 2009 H1N1 vaccine
should be patented and furthermore whether it is moral to allow the
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to obtain a patent.239
B. Recommendations to Resolve the Conflict Between Patents and
Public Health
The PTO’s conferral of a patent for a vaccine has sparked
heated discussions between intellectual property scholars, public
health agencies, and the government. Much of the contested issues
232

Id. at 130.
See Zard, supra note 49, at 491.
234
See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137.
235
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)(2) (2006). See also WIPO, Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), supra note 48.
236
See Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–92.
237
Arnoldo Lacayo, Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection, Public Health Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 304 (2002) (explaining that “stric[t] enforce[ment of]
pharmaceutical patents enables drug companies in the developed world to charge
exorbitant prices that the poor cannot afford”).
238
See generally Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–94.
239
See, e.g., Anna Bishop, Editorial, Let’s Get the H1N1 Vaccine to All, GUELPH
MERCURY, Oct. 13, 2009, at A2.
233
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relate to the morality of patenting a vaccine.240 Whether a vaccine
is perceived as a pharmaceutical or as a biotechnological
innovation, the crux of the argument is similar. On the one hand,
proponents of the patent would like to reward the pharmaceutical
company for creating the vaccine.241 On the other hand, those who
oppose the patent are concerned with advancing the public good,242
which in this case, involves protecting the public health by making
the vaccine widely accessible.243 A patented vaccine is generally
more costly.244 Hence, not all segments of the population would
be able to afford a patented vaccine.245
Although it is unclear whether the United States government
evaluated this issue in these terms, it is apparent that the Obama
administration recognized the severity of the viral 2009 H1N1
swine flu pandemic.246 The Obama administration was also
cognizant of the public health requirement that the 2009 H1N1
vaccine be made available to all members of the population.247
Thus, the federal government devised a solution wherein it
purchased 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines directly from the
pharmaceutical companies that invested time and resources in
creating the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.248 This mass purchase of
vaccines served to compensate the pharmaceutical companies for
their inventions, while simultaneously permitting the
240

Recall that a vaccine can be classified either as a pharmaceutical or as a
biotechnological creation. See supra text accompanying note 59. Both of these
classifications contain inherent morality issues. The two debates were presented in Part I
of this Note, which describes the views of proponents and opponents of vaccine patents
when vaccines are characterized either as pharmaceuticals or as biotechnological
innovations. See supra Part I.A.3.
241
See Santoro, supra note 62, at 928–29; see also MILLS, supra note 81, at 10.
Similarly, the Patent Act itself recognizes the need to reward the inventor by providing
the pharmaceutical company with the right of exclusivity. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
242
MILLS, supra note 81, at 12.
243
See Lacayo, supra note 237, at 304; see also Nicosia, supra note 8, at 491–94.
244
Lacayo, supra note 237, at 304.
245
Id.
246
See McNeil, Obama Warns of Return of Swine Flu in the Fall, supra note 169.
247
See id. The Obama administration authorized the stockpiling of medicines and
treatments designed to combat the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus. Editorial, Preparing for
the Swine Flu, supra note 169.
248
David Brown, Experts Say H1N1 Outrunning Vaccine, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2009,
at A4.
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pharmaceutical companies to maintain their right of exclusivity.249
The federal government concurrently addressed the public health
concerns by providing the vaccines it purchased to health care
providers, and ultimately to the general public, free of charge.250
This part of the federal government’s solution resolves the issue of
equal dissemination of an expensive vaccine to various
communities regardless of their socioeconomic status and ability to
afford the cost of the vaccine. Specifically, public medical clinics
were neither permitted to charge patients for the cost of the vaccine
nor for its administration.251 Furthermore, private health care
practitioners were only permitted to collect a co-payment for the
administration of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine to their insured
patients.252 Private health care providers who were the recipients
of federal funding were not permitted to charge the uninsured for
the administration of the vaccine.253 Thus, the government’s plan
addressed the difficulty of accessing medical care in the absence of
insurance coverage,254 which is another public health concern.
However, it is necessary to evaluate the federal government’s
plan from a financial perspective. Although the 2009 H1N1
vaccine was made available at no charge to the patient at the time
that it was administered, in fact there are hidden costs associated
with the vaccine. Rather than actually providing a free vaccine,
the federal government redistributed the money in its possession.
In order to pay for the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, taxes will likely need
to be raised in the future, thereby resulting in indirect payment for
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine by taxpaying members of the general

249

This decision conforms nicely with the principles of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to
exclude others from making . . . the invention throughout the United States.”).
250
See H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12–13.
251
Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, supra note 217.
252
See id. Even private health care providers are unable to charge their insured patients
for the cost of the vaccine itself because the practitioners did not purchase the 2009
H1N1 vaccine. Id.; see H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98,
at 12. Rather, the government provided the practitioners with the vaccine at no cost so
that it could subsequently be provided to their patients free of charge. See H1N1 Update
on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at 12–13.
253
See Flu.gov, Vaccine Cost, supra note 217.
254
See id.
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public.255 It is also likely that some of the federal funds that were
redistributed in order to fund the 2009 H1N1 vaccine initiative
were originally intended to fund other federal government projects
that may indirectly be negatively impacted as a result.
The Treasury established a Public Health Emergency Fund that
is made available to the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”)256 “without fiscal year limitation . . .
only if a public health emergency has been declared by the
Secretary.”257 Following the outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic and the April 2009 declaration of a public health
emergency by Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the HHS,258
Congress appropriated more money into the Public Health and
Social Services Emergency Fund.259 Congress set aside $1.85
billion “to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic,
including the development and purchase of vaccines, antivirals,
necessary medical supplies, diagnostics, and other surveillance
tools . . . relating to the 2009-H1N1 influenza outbreak.”260 This
Act provides the Secretary of the HHS with three possible
alternatives when responding to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
pandemic: (1) depositing the 2009 H1N1 vaccines, antivirals, and
other medical supplies purchased in order to combat the 2009
H1N1 swine flu pandemic into the Strategic National Stockpile;
(2) constructing privately owned laboratories that could assist in
255
Posting of Bonnie Erbe to U.S. News & World Report Opinion, Obama’s Response
to H1N1 Vaccine Crisis Could Be Key to Healthcare Reform, http://www.usnews.com
/blogs/erbe/2009/10/29/-obamas-response-to-h1n1-vaccine-crisis-could-be-key-tohealthcare-reform.html (Oct. 29, 2009, 16:32 EST) (discussing how government run
healthcare programs historically harm the middle-class taxpayers).
256
One role of the Secretary of the HHS includes the task of “oversee[ing] advanced
research, development, and procurement of qualified countermeasures . . . and qualified
pandemic and epidemic products.” 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10(b)(3) (2006).
257
Id. § 247d.
258
Jackie Calmes & Donald J. McNeil, Jr., Obama Declares the Swine Flu an
Emergency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at A1.
259
See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, 1884–86
(2009).
260
Id. at 1884. Of the additional funding worth $1.85 billion, Congress required that a
minimum of $350 million must be allocated to improving the states’ responses to the
2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic and that a minimum of $200 million be provided to the
CDC for both laboratory research and surveillance of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu. Id. at
1884–85.
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the production of an adequate supply of the 2009 H1N1 swine flu
vaccine and other necessary biologics; and (3) combining this
funding (with the exception of funds that must be allocated to both
state preparedness and to the CDC) with other funding that is
available to the HHS and other federal agencies.261
In addition to the funds made available to the Secretary of the
HHS, another $5.8 billion of funding is controlled directly by the
President.262 These additional funds can be appropriated “as
emergency funds required to address critical needs related to
emerging influenza viruses.”263 The President may also allow this
additional emergency fund to be used for the purchase of vaccines
and other biologics for the Strategic National Stockpile.264 In
addition, after consultation with the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, these funds can be merged with other
federal accounts held by either the HHS or other federal agencies
for use at their discretion in the event of a public health crisis.265
Although the government attempted to ensure equal
distribution of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and initially succeeded in
this public health goal, the current scarcity of the vaccine will
likely disturb the government’s allocation initiatives.266 A limited
supply of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine will ultimately lead to unequal
distribution in some manner because everyone who would like to
access the vaccine will be unable to do so. The waning supply
could also result in socioeconomic stratification or in other
rationing strategies based on the patient’s age, geographic location,
exposure to other individuals who are afflicted with the 2009
H1N1 swine flu virus, or based on a first-come-first-served
method.267 In addition, there is a scarcity of the 2009 seasonal flu
vaccine.268 The scarcity of both the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the
261

See id. at 1884–86.
Id. at 1885.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
See Editorial, Take the Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A34, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/opinion/05thu3.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=vaccine%20
scarcity&st=cse.
267
See generally Gostin & Berkman, supra note 89, at 137–40.
268
McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.
262
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2009 seasonal flu vaccine likely resulted because the resources of
the same pharmaceutical companies became overtaxed when the
pharmaceutical companies produced both of the influenza vaccines
during the 2009 flu season.269 “Federal officials and independent
flu experts have said that the situation was unavoidable, given that
the global swine flu pandemic has raised demand for all flu shots
far beyond what manufacturers can make in a year.”270
This scarcity of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine provides even more
importance to the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (“ACIP”) that establishes a priority list of those
individuals who should receive the vaccine.271 This list includes
pregnant women, healthcare providers, all individuals between six
months and twenty-four years of age, caregivers of children under
six months of age, and people between the ages of twenty-five and
sixty-four years old who are suffering from other health
complications.272
ACIP’s prioritization is based upon its
evaluation of “current disease patterns, populations most at risk for
severe illness based on current trends in illness, hospitalizations
and deaths, how much vaccine is expected to be available, and the
timing of vaccine availability.”273 This prioritization list will
further ensure that the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is offered widely to all
individuals regardless of their socioeconomic class.
Thus,
individuals who are listed on ACIP’s list will receive vaccination
priority and socioeconomic stratification will be avoided.
Although this prioritization does benefit some individuals before
others, this order of patients requiring priority vaccination was
established after analyzing medical needs and thus should not be
considered an immoral form of unequal distribution.
Furthermore, in order to avoid socioeconomic stratification, the
government must ensure that these 250 million vaccines are
available to all segments of the population, to both private
269

See generally FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition
and Lot Release, supra note 3.
270
McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.
271
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Vaccination
Recommendations, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/acip.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
272
See id.
273
Id.
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physicians and to public medical clinics. This equality can be
established by evaluating which physicians and medical personnel
are obtaining the 2009 H1N1 vaccines that the government
procured. Similarly, it is also important to consider which projects
may be negatively impacted as they will not benefit from the
federal funds that were redistributed by the federal government to
purchase the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the sum that was made
available in the Public Health Emergency Fund.274 It is necessary
to ensure that the redistributed funding does not negatively impact
the funding of other programs for the indigent in order to provide
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine at no cost to both the underprivileged
population as well as to members of the wealthier population.
Monitoring these variables will ensure that these vaccines are
being equally distributed to members of all socioeconomic classes.
The resolution that the government adopted is sensible because
it adequately recognizes the need to compensate pharmaceutical
manufacturers while simultaneously providing the 2009 H1N1
vaccine to the public at no charge. However, it would be
preferable that the plan be amended to include a safety net when a
vaccine scarcity is encountered during a pandemic. This proposal
would encourage the government to set up additional laboratory
facilities that would be able to assist the private pharmaceutical
companies in producing a sufficient supply of vaccines that may
become necessary to counteract the pandemic.275 In this scenario,
private pharmaceutical companies would produce the vaccines to
their maximum capacity while simultaneously allowing the
government laboratories to produce the balance of the vaccines
that are required. The pharmaceutical companies’ patents would
still be in effect, but government laboratories would assist in the
production of the balance of vaccines needed, thus sharing in the
exclusivity rights in a manner reminiscent of a licensing

274

See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
In fact, a similar notion was contemplated by Congress that states, “funds may be
used for the construction or renovation of privately owned facilities for the production of
pandemic influenza vaccine and other biologics, where the Secretary finds such a
contract necessary to secure sufficient supplies of such vaccines or biologics.”
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, 1885 (2009).
275
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agreement.276 Therefore, the government would be limited to
producing the drug in the short-term only when needed to meet
urgent public health needs. In addition, the federal government
would provide the pharmaceutical companies with additional
compensation for temporarily sharing their right of exclusivity.
If this proposal had been adopted in time for the 2009 H1N1
swine flu pandemic, the government could have assisted the
private pharmaceutical companies in manufacturing the 2009
H1N1 vaccine. Thus the public could have benefited as it is much
less likely that a scarcity of either the 2009 H1N1 vaccine or the
2009 seasonal flu vaccine would have occurred. Furthermore, the
government could have continued to compensate the 2009 H1N1
vaccine’s inventors and to provide this vaccine to all segments of
the public while concurrently avoiding a vaccine shortage.
Preventing a shortage of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine would have likely
ensured its equal availability to all members of the population.
Additional methods could be implemented to resolve the
conflict that arises between the exclusive rights granted by patents
and the urgent need for widespread availability of certain
pharmaceutical or biotechnological products to the public in
emergency situations. In the past, when governments combated
health crises, they did “not avoid the temptation to ignore patent
rights when an underlying innovation [was] needed to respond to a
crisis such as a health related epidemic.”277 For example, Congress
and President George W. Bush’s administration were faced with a
conflict between a public health emergency and patent law when
an anthrax terrorist attack was anticipated in 2001.278 This conflict
resulted because Bayer Pharmaceuticals had been granted a patent
276

See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal
representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States.”).
277
Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such as an Influenza
Pandemic, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/
Students/academics/journals/law-review/Issues/archives/upload/Crouch.pdf.
However,
when determining the resulting infringement cases, courts must evaluate the impact of the
infringement upon the public before an injunction is imposed. eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
278
See Crouch, supra note 277, at 1128.
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for Cipro, an antibiotic drug that cures anthrax.279 Although the
government threatened to break the Cipro patent in order to
stockpile the drug, it was able to reach an agreement with Bayer
Pharmaceuticals wherein Cipro would be made available at a
reduced price, and thus, would be widely accessible to the public
in case of a widespread anthrax attack.280
In the event that inevitable conflicts arise between patent law
and public health needs, the government can decide to break a
patent. “A ‘broken’ patent might be defined as a patent whose
rights are willfully ignored without recourse.”281 However, instead
of intentionally breaking a patent and purposefully ignoring the
rights of patent exclusivity, the government can choose to bend a
patent by partially breaking it or merely threatening to break the
patent.282 “The bottom line here is that—in an emergent crisis—
government entities will likely have both the legal right and
political mandate to bend if not break patent rights over
innovations deemed important in resolving the crisis.”283 Yet, if
governments were to regularly implement this approach and to
disregard patents, a disincentive for pharmaceutical companies to
create drugs and vaccines that may be used when responding to
public health crises may ensue.
Instead, pharmaceutical
manufacturers may choose to focus their resources on developing
biologics for illnesses that are not infectious diseases or public
health threats.284 Thus, a compromise wherein compensation
would be made to the patentees by the government in the event that
a patent must be bent or broken would benefit the public health
initiative in the long run.

279

See id. Cipro is a pharmaceutical product; it is not a vaccine. U.S. Patent No.
4,670,444 (filed May 29, 1984) (issued June 2, 1987).
280
See Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 127
(2002).
281
Crouch, supra note 277, at 1129.
282
See id. at 1129–30
283
Id. at 1132.
284
See id. at 1133–34 (“If the law offers weaker rights, a potential innovator will
presumably feel marginally less inclined to pursue the innovation. Following that
premise, we expect that the reduced strength of patent rights during a public health crisis
would likely reduce the incentive to innovate targeted solutions.”).
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Public health goals are also threatened by various other
potential costs relating to vaccine production such as the costs
associated with the defense of future litigation, for example.
Capping such ancillary costs that pharmaceutical producers of
drugs or vaccines may potentially incur would bolster public health
goals further. Congress can accomplish this goal by extending the
safeguards against future litigation in a manner similar to the
Swine Flu Act of 1976.285 The notion of indemnifying the
pharmaceutical companies and transferring the risk of litigation to
the government exclusively in a manner similar to the Swine Flu
Act of 1976286 would encourage future research and development
of novel pharmaceutical or biotechnological innovations.
However, this indemnification would entail inherent risks for the
government in the instances where drugs and vaccines are
determined to be unsafe. In fact, Guillain-Barré syndrome, a
potential risk associated with this indemnification materialized in
response to the 1976 swine flu vaccine.287 If needed, the President
could allocate some of the government’s emergency funds for use
in defending or financing settlements for potential lawsuits should
they occur. Although this suggestion may include drawbacks for
the government, it likely would further incentivize pharmaceutical
companies to create drugs and vaccines. Moreover, this policy
would contribute to the public good while simultaneously
minimizing the financial risks that manufacturers of novel vaccines
and other anti-infective products may need to incur.
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT TERMS AND DISEASE DURATION
This section analyzes the timing issues that exist between a
patent term and the length of time that a flu vaccine is considered
effective. Part III.A asks whether patents are the most effective
approach to provide incentives for the pharmaceutical companies
producing the 2009 H1N1 vaccine while ensuring the public good.
The conflict between the relatively short duration of the 2009
H1N1 vaccine’s medical utility versus the twenty-year term of
285
286
287

See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20309 and accompanying text.
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exclusivity that is conferred when a patent is issued for this
vaccine is discussed. Part III.B provides recommendations to
resolve this conflict. It proposes that, rather than focusing on the
short utility of the flu vaccine itself, patentees recognize that
vaccines and other biotechnological innovations benefit the public
good beyond the initial disease duration. The usefulness of the
scientific process utilized in creating the vaccine that is introduced
by the inventor greatly outlasts the relatively short time frame
wherein the actual vaccine is used to combat a seasonal disease.
A. Conflict Between Influenza Timing and the Patent Term—Is
Patent the Right Approach?
Intellectual property law grants patents for a period of twenty
years.288 During the patent term, the patent holder possesses an
exclusive right over the patented creation.289 This exclusivity
allows the patentee “to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States”290 for the
term of the patent.
The Patent Act states that a patent term extends for a period of
twenty years.291 However, in actuality, the patentees do not hold
an exclusive right to the invention for the full twenty years
described in the statute. In fact, although the twenty-year patent
term begins to toll from the date a patent application is filed,292 the
patentees are unable to enforce their exclusivity right until the date
288

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
Id. § 154(a)(1).
290
Id.
291
Id. § 154(a)(2) (describing a “term beginning on the date on which the patent issues
and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the
United States”).
292
Id.; see Osenga, supra note 41, at 127 (discussing problems associated with slow
issuance); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement
and Immunity in the Development of Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
111, 123 (2005) (“Since no patent rights exist while the application is pending, the
effective term of a patent is twenty years minus the time the PTO takes to examine the
application. Although the examination period varies for different types of inventions, the
average time is slightly over two years, thus making the average patent term around
seventeen to eighteen years, although it may be considerably shorter if the examination
time is lengthy.”).
289
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that the patent is granted.293 “Thus, the period between the date an
application is filed and the date the patent ultimately issues is
essentially a dead period for the patentee . . . .”294 Regardless of
the length of time it takes the PTO to grant a patent, it will
certainly be issued at a later date than when the patent was filed
and thus could not possibly provide the patentee with a full twenty
years to enjoy the rights of exclusivity.
Vaccine production, including the manufacturing process of the
2009 H1N1 vaccine,295 is even more complex than the production
method for other pharmaceuticals.296 Unlike other biologics,
vaccines “are hard to make”297 because they must contain the
relevant strain of the specific virus that the vaccine aims to
prevent, whereas drugs and other pharmaceuticals that combat
disease symptoms lack this complexity since they are not specific
to certain viral strains.298 However, typically vaccines are
lucrative innovations.299 Specifically, the Patent Act rewards
vaccine creators by allowing them to both reap financial rewards
and to exclusively manufacture their invention for the patent
term.300 Yet, the flu vaccine does not share this lucrative
characteristic with other vaccines.301 Flu vaccine “[p]rofits are
lower and [an] unused flu vaccine expires after a few months.”302
Furthermore, in contrast to other vaccines, such as the MMR
vaccine which does not change in effectiveness from year to

293

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Osenga, supra note 41, at 127.
Osenga, supra note 41, at 127–28.
295
See, e.g., CDC, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vaccine, supra note 3.
296
See supra Part I.B.2 (summarizing the characteristics unique to vaccines); see also
McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.
297
McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.
298
See generally CDC, Seasonal Influenza, supra note 54.
299
McElligott, supra note 62, at 433 n.87.
300
See WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 48.
301
See McNeil, Nation Is Facing Vaccine Shortage for Seasonal Flu, supra note 219.
302
Id.
294
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year,303 a flu vaccine is generally only profitable for one flu
season, which lasts for only several months.304
This notion of the limited duration of a flu vaccine’s relevance
is especially applicable in the case of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine,
which is only expected to be clinically effective for the 2009 flu
season.305 Therefore, the swine flu vaccine creator may not need a
twenty-year patent. Perhaps another method of acknowledging
and rewarding the creator of a flu vaccine would be both more
desirable and more efficient.
B. Recommendations to Resolve the Conflict Between Disease
Duration and the Patent Term
This section provides two recommendations to resolve the
conflict between the short duration of a flu season, which is
associated with the short-term use of the vaccine, and the twentyyear patent term. Part III.B.1 proposes an eighteen-hour expedited
patent application review and a shortened patent term during
public health emergencies. The patent application should be
evaluated before the rest of the queue. Part III.B.2 resolves the
conflict by underscoring the usefulness of the patented vaccine
creation process for the twenty-year patent term despite the shortterm use of the vaccine itself.
1. Recommendation: Shortened Patent Term and Expedited
Review Process
Given the fact that the patent term begins to toll on the date
that the patent application is filed and before the patent is issued,
creators of pharmaceuticals and other biologics would be unable to
benefit from the full twenty-year patent term.306 This issue is
compounded when flu vaccine patents are considered because the
303

See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Measles, Mumps, and
Rubella (MMR) Vaccine, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/Vaccines/MMR/MMR.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010). The MMR vaccine is a single vaccine that protects against
three diseases: measles, mumps, and rubella. Id.
304
See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also CDC, The Flu Season, supra
note 55.
305
See generally H1N1 Update on Answers to Physician Questions, supra note 98, at
10.
306
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
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seasonal flu vaccine is only effective for one flu season.307
Although the 2009 H1N1 swine flu differs from the seasonal flu308
and thus it could potentially remain viable for longer than one flu
season, the 2009 H1N1 swine flu is a virus that already has begun
to mutate.309 Any change to the 2009 H1N1 swine flu virus could
render the 2009 H1N1 vaccine ineffective. In fact, it is ironic that
in some cases, the influenza season for which the vaccine was
created may conclude before the patent is issued by the PTO.310
Therefore, it seems that the pharmaceutical companies that created
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine would only benefit from an expedited
patent application review and would require a shortened
exclusivity period.
This quickly changing technology can be analogized to the
rapidly evolving computer and software technologies.311 This is an
apt analogy because “an entire generation of programs can cycle
within a matter of months, in the continuous process of software
development.”312 Similarly, the effectiveness of the flu vaccine
also only lasts for a few months during the flu season.313
Shortened patent terms have been suggested in response to these
quickly evolving software programs.314 An abbreviated patent
term would likely only be chosen when the “subject matter of the

307

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See CDC, 2009 H1N1 Flu, supra note 10.
309
See, e.g., World Health Organization, Public Health Significance of Virus Mutation
Detected in Norway (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes
/briefing_20091120/en/.
310
A seasonal flu vaccine is only effective for one flu season, which spans several
months. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also CDC, The Flu Season, supra
note 55. The patent application for the seasonal flu vaccine will begin to toll when the
patent is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). However, the patent prosecution period is
generally two to three years. See generally Ho, supra note 292, at 123; Lemley, supra
note 21, at 1500. Thus, although the flu vaccine will hold a patent for a twenty-year
term, the utility of the vaccine will only exist for several months, which will likely
coincide with the patent prosecution period.
311
See generally Osenga, supra note 41; Kirk D. Rowe, Note, Why Pay for What’s
Free?: Minimizing the Patent Threat to Free and Open Source Software, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 595 (2008).
312
Rowe, supra note 311, at 617.
313
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
314
Osenga, supra note 41, at 149 (proposing a six-year patent term); Rowe, supra note
311, at 617 (suggesting a seven-year patent term for software).
308
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patent is in a high-tech field with a short life cycle.”315 In order to
ensure the invention’s utility in light of the shortened patent term,
proposals for abbreviated patents also contain a guarantee that the
patents will be granted within one year of the filing date of the
patent application.316 However, even a one-year patent application
evaluation period could render a flu vaccine patent useless because
the vaccine would be unlikely to provide an effective medical
treatment one year after its creation (a new influenza virus will
emerge and a new vaccine will have to be developed).
Furthermore, during the evaluation period itself, the creator lacks
the right of exclusivity that a patent confers. Yet, it should be
noted that “the total average time the [patent] examiner spends
on . . . the two- to three- year prosecution of the patent is eighteen
hours.”317 Therefore, the PTO could technically issue a patent, if it
intends to grant one at all, within eighteen hours after receiving the
patent application. Thus, in public health emergency situations,
such as the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic, the PTO should issue
a patent within eighteen hours of receiving the patent application.
This form of expedited PTO approval would place public health
patents that are associated with curtailing emergency public health
situations at the beginning of the queue inspected by the patent
examiners.
Moreover, rather than applying for patent protection, the
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine could be provided with nonpatent incentives to produce the vaccine. For example, rather than
motivate the pharmaceutical companies to produce the 2009 H1N1
vaccine so that they could obtain a patent and simultaneously
obtain the right to exclusivity,318 the government could have
provided the pharmaceutical companies with a payment advance to
encourage research and development of flu vaccines. However,
the government would be unable to predict which pharmaceutical
companies will ultimately succeed in creating the necessary flu
vaccine. Thus, in order to provide the pharmaceutical companies
315

Osenga, supra note 41, at 148.
See id.
317
Lemley, supra note 21, at 1500.
318
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); WIPO, Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs), supra note 48.
316
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with an additional incentive to develop the 2009 H1N1 vaccine in
lieu of patents, the federal government could have created a
contract with the pharmaceutical companies which could have
included bonus clauses to reward the successful and timely
production of the flu vaccine. The exact sum of the bonuses to be
provided could be adjusted based on the severity and complexity of
the disease and the virus strains involved.
2. Recommendation: Patenting the Vaccine Creation Process
Upon further analysis, it is possible that pharmaceutical
companies could in fact benefit from patenting the 2009 H1N1
vaccine for the full twenty-year term. Although the patented
innovation would probably not provide any medical benefit for the
duration of the twenty-year patent term for the specific influenza
virus it was intended to combat, the scientific process disclosed in
the patent could prove beneficial to other scientists for a period of
time lasting even longer than the twenty-year patent term.319
Future scientific creations could be based upon past discoveries by
employing the process disclosed in previous patents.320 In fact,
this situation occurred when pharmaceutical companies created the
2009 H1N1 vaccine. This vaccine built on the knowledge and the
scientific process utilized by the creators of the 2009 seasonal flu
vaccine.321 The 2009 H1N1 vaccine consists of “a strain change to
each manufacturer’s seasonal influenza vaccine.”322
Another example involves adjuvants, which can increase an
immune cell’s recognition of an antigen and can be used in the
production of vaccines.323 The “development of adjuvants in the
1980s and 1990s are bearing fruit now.”324 Specifically, adjuvants
are used in the 2009 H1N1 vaccine produced by Novartis Vaccines
and Diagnostics Ltd. that it submitted for patent.325 This
319

See FDA, Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccines Composition and Lot
Release, supra note 3.
320
See id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Nathalie Garcon & Michel Goldman, Boosting Vaccine Power, 301 SCI. AM. 72, 78
(2009).
324
Id.
325
See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 20090047353 (filed Nov. 6, 2006).
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application of previously researched scientific technology is
extremely beneficial since fewer antigens are required for
immunization, which leads to a speedier vaccine production time
frame.326 By adding adjuvants to the vaccine, both the seasonal flu
vaccine and the H5N1 avian flu, for example, “elicited protective
antibody responses using just a third the amount of antigen in a
typical flu season vaccine.”327
“Pandemic influenza requires large populations to be
vaccinated. Adjuvants can make vaccines effective with less
antigen per dose and possibly protective against flu strains that
vary slightly from the original.”328 Thus, it is likely that the 2009
patent application submitted by Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics
Ltd. builds upon scientific processes discovered previously that
greatly benefit public health goals. In fact, the National Institutes
of Health (“NIH”) is currently sponsoring additional research
leading to vaccine adjuvant discovery.329 “Adjuvants can be used
not only to enhance the immune response to a vaccine and thereby
offer better protection, but also to extend the vaccine supply if
needed, enabling more people to be vaccinated with fewer
doses.”330
This type of novel vaccine technology is not limited in its
application to a seasonal influenza or to a unique pandemic.
Rather, its scientific ramifications are long-lasting. The patent
holder of adjuvant technology discoveries will most certainly
benefit over the twenty-year patent term because the process of
adding adjuvants can be patented in addition to patenting the
vaccine produced. While the vaccine patent may only provide the
patentee with exclusive benefits for a short time period limited to
the duration of a flu season, the creation process employed when
inventing a flu vaccine will exhibit utility even after the
culmination of a particular flu season. Thus, the patentee would

326

Garcon & Goldman, supra note 323, at 78.
Id.
328
Id.
329
Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAID Announces Vaccine Adjuvant
Discovery Contracts (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/oct2009/niaid08.htm.
330
Id.
327
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benefit from the twenty-year patent term if the process, as well as
the product, is patented.
Additional proof that flu vaccine patents can still provide
scientific benefit even when they are no longer medically useful
can be gleaned from the patents that were granted in relation to the
1976 H1N1 vaccine.331 Although the patents granted for the 1976
H1N1 vaccine lost their clinical significance when people who
received the vaccination developed Guillain-Barré syndrome, a
paralyzing neuromuscular disorder,332 these patents have
maintained their scientific and research benefits and have both
been cited in future patent applications as recently as a patent that
was filed in 2006 and issued in 2008.333 The scientific process
utilized in the creation of the 1976 H1N1 vaccine has outlasted the
usefulness of both the vaccine itself and its twenty-year patent
term. This phenomenon illustrates the long term applicability of
the creation process. Hence, this analysis underscores the value of
a twenty-year patent term that could prove beneficial to the
creators of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine if they patent the creation
process as well as the vaccine produced.
The debate regarding the utility of a twenty-year patent term
for the 2009 H1N1 vaccine must consider whether a vaccine is
primarily a pharmaceutical (product) or a biotechnological
(process) innovation. If the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is viewed as a
pharmaceutical and only the product itself is patented, then its
benefits are solely medical and a twenty-year patent term would
not provide the patentee with any benefits because the
pharmaceutical companies would be unable to capitalize on their
331

See U.S. Patent No. 4,009,258 (filed Aug. 5, 1974) (issued Feb. 22, 1977); see also
U.S. Patent No. 4,029,763 (filed Jan. 16, 1975) (issued June 14, 1977).
332
FAUCI ET AL., supra note 59, at 2462; Appel, supra note 189, at 71.
333
U.S. Patent No. 7,468,187 (filed Oct. 5, 2006) (issued Dec. 23, 2008). Another
eleven patent applications cite to U.S. Patent No. 4,029,763 and a total of sixteen patent
applications cite to U.S. Patent No. 4,009,258. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Results
of Search in U.S. Patent Collection db for REF/4029763, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacg
i/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsearch-adv.htm
&r=0&f=S&l=50&d=PALL&Query=ref/4029763 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009); U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection db for
REF/4009258, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&
p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsearchadv.htm&r=0&f=S&l=50&d=PALL&Query=ref/40092
58 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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right of exclusivity for the majority of the patent term.334
However, if the 2009 H1N1 vaccine is perceived to be a
biotechnological innovation and the creation process is patented,
then the scientific process involved in creating the vaccine and the
information gleaned from the 2009 H1N1 vaccine patent would
potentially allow the patentee to reap financial rewards for the full
twenty-year patent term.
Patents encourage innovation, thereby leading to
pharmaceutical and biotechnological advances that will promote
life and benefit the public. Thus, the patent term of twenty years
for a flu vaccine is logical if the creation process is patented. The
novel technology will be applicable to the creation of other
vaccines and will generally promote the public good.
CONCLUSION
The 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic highlights the tension
between the inherent purpose of patent law as set forth in the
Patent Act and the goals of public health. Patents seek to reward
the pharmaceutical companies that invested time and resources to
develop the 2009 H1N1 vaccine335 whereas public health goals
strive to distribute the 2009 H1N1 vaccine widely throughout the
population.336 In an effort to advance public health goals, the
federal government purchased 250 million 2009 H1N1 vaccines
and engaged in the widespread dissemination of the vaccine at no
cost to the public, thereby increasing accessibility of the vaccine

334

Each year different strains of the flu virus develop. Therefore, new vaccines will be
produced to provide immunity against the new influenze strains. A vaccine will expire
after the flu season is over, usually within a year of its production, which signals the end
of the profitability of this particular “pharmaceutical product.” See CDC, Shortened
Expiration Period for Sanofi Pasteur 2009 H1N1 Vaccine in Pre-filled Syringes
Questions & Answers (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/qa_
expiration.htm; see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Notice of Expiration Date Change of
Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccine 1 (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.health.
state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/h1n1/health_care_providers/vaccine/docs/2
010-1-11_notice_of_expiration_date_change.pdf (listing expiration dates of three
different H1N1 2009 Monovalent vaccines as of January 2010).
335
See supra Part I.A.2.
336
See supra Part I.B.1.
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despite individuals’ socioeconomic statuses.337 However, the
federal government could have assisted private pharmaceutical
companies in the production of the vaccine for the length of the
pandemic in a manner similar to a licensing agreement in order to
avoid the shortages of both the 2009 H1N1 vaccine and the 2009
seasonal flu vaccine.338
Another discrepancy exists between the lengthy twenty-year
patent term and the reality that an influenza vaccine provides a
medical benefit for only several months. However, this conflict
only poses problems when considering the 2009 H1N1 vaccine
from a purely clinical perspective. Evaluating the 2009 H1N1
vaccine as a biotechnological innovation—as a step forward in the
progression of science—rather than as a strictly pharmaceutical
advance, permits inventors to reveal valuable scientific creation
processes that would remain applicable for a longer length of time
than the 2009 H1N1 vaccine’s short period of clinical utility.339 A
twenty-year patent term remains valuable to the pharmaceutical
companies that created the 2009 H1N1 vaccine because they retain
exclusive control over the novel discoveries presented in their
research, which could serve as a template for future vaccine
production.340

337
338
339
340

See supra Part I.C.4.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part III.B.2.

